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1 Introduction
Individual decisions are often made within a larger social structure. I am interested in
studying the effect of social and geographical structures on individual decisions, especially
when actions are substitutable and exhibit local externalities. The overarching theme of
my dissertation is to study mechanisms that can raise the total social welfare in social
dilemmas in exogenous networks.
The existing literature studying the effect of network structure on public good provi-
sion reports a negative relationship between the number of neighbors an individual has
and their likelihood of investing. The evidence points to the lack of incentives that indi-
viduals in central network positions have to invest in the local public good. The first chap-
ter uses a laboratory experiment to test the relative efficacy of two cost sharing rules in
raising efficiency across three network structures in a best shot public goods game. Across
the three network structures, I vary the asymmetry in the number of neighbors each posi-
tion has in the network. The two cost sharing rules are designed to incentivize individuals
with more neighbors to invest. The first rule is a local cost sharing, where individuals who
invest receive transfers from each of their neighbors who do not invest. The second is a
global cost sharing rule, where the total cost of investment is equally divided among indi-
viduals who benefit from the public good. Efficiency of provision is the lowest in absence
of cost sharing rules. The low efficiency is driven by under-provision of the public good.
Introducing the two cost sharing rules increases the provision of the public good. The local
cost sharing rule increases efficiency across all three network structures. The effectiveness
of the global cost sharing rule in raising efficiency decreases as the asymmetry of the net-
work structure increases.
Communication can be critical in resolving inefficiency in social dilemmas. Commu-
nication can help with coordination by reducing strategic uncertainty in a public goods
game in networks. The benefit from the public good is constrained by the underlying net-
work structure. However, the actions of unconnected individuals influence equilibrium
1
selection. In the second chapter, I explore the effectiveness of two communication archi-
tectures in increasing the efficiency of the provision of public goods in a best-shot game
across three network structures. The first communication structure is global, where every-
one in the group can talk to each other. The second structure is local, where only mem-
bers who are connected can communicate with each other. Frequent mis-coordination and
underinvestment lead to lower efficiency when groups don’t have the option to communi-
cate. Communication increases both the likelihood of coordinating locally between neigh-
bors and on the equilibrium profiles as a group across all network structures.
I conclude the dissertation with a discussion about the efficacy of two mechanisms:
cost sharing and communication and their policy implications. I also discuss avenues for
future work.
2
2 Cost Sharing in Public Goods Games in Network1
2.1 Introduction
The decisions made by individuals in central positions in social and geographical net-
works have asymmetric effects on social welfare when actions exhibit local positive exter-
nalities Zenou (2016). Costly investment decisions by individuals in central positions bene-
fit a large number of people who are connected to them. These decisions could range from
farmers deciding whether to invest in a new crop or farming technique2 to physicians de-
ciding whether to adopt a new procedure or protocol3 or R&D decisions (Bramoullé, 2007,
Bramoullé et al., 2014). There is no a priori reason to expect central individuals to behave
pro-socially. In fact, if actions are substitutable the incentive is to not invest and free-ride
on investment decisions of people connected to them4.
The experimental literature studying the effect of network structure on public good
provision finds an inverse relationship between the number of neighbors and the likelihood
of making an investment (Charness et al., 2014, Rosenkranz and Weitzel, 2012). There is
little empirical evidence on mechanisms that can motivate individuals in central positions
to make costly pro-social investment decisions. Dufwenberg and Patel (2017) and Jack-
son and Wilkie (2005) show that theoretically cost sharing agreements can raise efficiency
in public good provision. Dufwenberg and Patel (2017) argues that reciprocity alone is
not sufficient but combined with cost sharing can enhance the private provision of public
goods.
Therefore, I investigate the efficacy of two cost sharing rules on efficiency in a best shot
1I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Vjollca Sadiraj, James Cox, and Tom Mroz for their
valuable feedback. Feedback from participants at Fifth and Fourth Network Science and Economics Con-
ference 2019 and 2018, and the Southern Economic Association Annual Meetings in 2018 and 2016. The
experiments were funded through the Andrew Young School Dissertation Fellowship.
2There is a large body of literature highlighting the importance of social learning in technology adop-
tion and diffusion (Chuang and Schechter, 2015, Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010, Conley and Udry, 2010).
3Tasselli (2014) provides an excellent overview of the literature studying the effect of social networks
on physician’s decisions.
4An equilibrium where the maximum number of unlinked agents are investing is stochastically stable
in a best-shot public good games (Boncinelli and Pin, 2012, Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007).
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public good game5 (Hirshleifer, 1983) across three network structures in a laboratory ex-
periment. In the local cost sharing rule individuals who invest get a transfer of a fixed
proportion of the cost from each of their neighbors who don’t invest. This rule exploits
the number of connections of the individuals to align their incentives with social efficiency,
since for a given cost sharing proportion the cost of investing is decreasing as the number
of neighbors increases. The global cost sharing rule is based on the component-wise egal-
itarian allocation rule (Jackson, 2005); here, the total cost of provision is equally shared
among individuals who benefit from the public good. Payoff for everyone in the group is
maximized when everyone in the group benefits from the public good and the least num-
ber of individuals are investing.
I vary the number of neighbors that individuals have across the network structures.
The Circle network is symmetric, and everyone has two neighbors, whereas the Line and
Asymmetric networks are not symmetric. In the Line, individuals in the periphery have
one neighbor, and others have two neighbors, and in the Asymmetric network, individuals
have either one, two or three neighbors. This asymmetry provides a rich environment to
test the relative efficacy of the two cost sharing rules in increasing efficiency across differ-
ent network structures.
Across all network structures, the efficiency6 is the lowest in the treatment with no cost
sharing rules. The low level of efficiency is driven by under-provision7 only 72% of the
group member has access to a public good compared to 92% when the two cost sharing
rules are introduced. Consistent with earlier research (Charness et al., 2014, Rosenkranz
and Weitzel, 2012) I find a negative relationship between the number of neighbors an in-
dividual has and their likelihood of investing in the non-symmetric networks. This pattern
of investment lowers efficiency due to excess investment in the public good. The local cost
5See Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) for experiments on a best-shot game.
6Efficiency is defined as the ratio of the realized group profit and maximum possible total profit in
each round.
7Under-provision is defined as the ratio of the number of subjects who benefit from the public good
and the total number of group members.
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sharing treatment is successful in increasing efficiency across all network structures by in-
centivizing individuals with more neighbors to invest. In the global cost sharing rule, as
the asymmetry in the network increases, the effectiveness of the rule in raising efficiency
decreases. Compared to the baseline the access to public good increases with introducing
the global cost sharing rule however, it is mired by over investment.
Comparing across networks, I find the efficiency is highest in the Circle network, which
is in line with the previous findings (Fatas et al., 2010, Carpenter et al., 2012, Rosenkranz
and Weitzel, 2012, Leibbrandt et al., 2015, Boosey and Isaac, 2016)‘.
This chapter contributes to the small literature on public goods game in network8. In
particular, Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012) and Charness et al. (2014) find that individuals
with more neighbors contribute less than players with fewer neighbors. The closest to my
work is Charness et al. (2014) which reports that in a best shot public goods game groups
start by coordinating on the efficient equilibria and eventually drift towards the stable in-
efficient equilibrium9. There is little evidence pointing at mechanisms that incentivize cen-
tral individuals to make costly pro-social investments. Caria and Fafchamps (2018) reports
results from an artifactual field experiment with farmers in India, where they exploit guilt
aversion as the mechanism to induce pro-social behavior. They find that individuals in the
center of a star network are more likely to invest once subjects are made aware of the ex-
pectations of the individuals in the periphery. I contribute to this literature by offering
two cost sharing rules which facilitate groups to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium by
incentivizing central individuals to invest in the public good.
In the next section, I present a theoretical analysis and derive testable hypotheses. Sec-
tion 2.3 presents the experiment design and procedures. I present the empirical results in
Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 concludes.
8(Fatas et al., 2010, Carpenter et al., 2012, Rosenkranz and Weitzel, 2012, Leibbrandt et al., 2015,
Charness et al., 2014, Boosey and Isaac, 2016, Caria and Fafchamps, 2018). See Choi et al. (2016) for an
excellent overview of laboratory experiments in networks.
9In a stochastically stable equilibrium maximum number of agents are investing Boncinelli and Pin
(2012).
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2.2 Predictions
Consider n agents and let the set of agents be N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i simul-
taneously chooses to either invest (1) or not invest (0) in a local public good. Let a =
(a1, . . . , an) denote the action profile of all agents, where ai ∈ {0, 1} is agent i’s action.
Agent i’s action determines her payoff and affects payoffs of the agents to whom she is
linked through positive externalities. Agents are assigned on an undirected graph. Any
two agents i and j who share a local public good are represented by a link: gij = gji = 1.
For two agents who are not linked gij = gji = 0. Let the collection of all links be repre-
sented by n× n matrix G. Let Ni denote the set of agents who are directly linked to agent
i, called agent i’s neighbors : Ni = {j ∈ N/i : gij = 1}. Agents i’s neighborhood is defined
as herself and the set of her neighbors; i.e., {i} ∪Ni.
An agent gets a benefit of (b) from the local public good if she or any of her direct
neighbors invest. The cost of providing the local public good, c, is positive but smaller
than b. Let aj denote the set of actions of all agents j 6= i. An agent i’s payoff:
ui(ai,aj ,G) = b× 1
{∑
j
gijaj + ai ≥ 1
}
− c× ai (1)
It is straightforward to show that each agent i’s best reply is: ai = 1 if no one in the
neighborhood invest and (ii) ai = 0, if at least one of her neighbors invest.
I consider three networks of five agents – Line, Asymmetric, and Circle (see Figure 1).
Table 1 reports the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for each network structure. One of the
central features of this game is the multiplicity of equilibria. Boncinelli and Pin (2012) re-
fine the equilibrium set through stochastic stability, and show that if the source of error af-
fects both investing and not investing agents or agents randomize using a logistic response,
then the only stochastically stable states are Nash equilibria with the largest number of
unlinked agents investing. Based on the empirical evidence in favor of Boncinelli and Pin
(2012) in public good experiments in networks (Charness et al., 2014), I expect that when
6
there is no cost sharing groups are more likely to coordinate on the stochastically stable
equilibrium.
D
C
EA
B
Line
D
C
EA
B
Asymmetric
D
C
EA
B
Circle
Figure 1: Network structures in the experiment
To analyze the welfare implications of different equilibria, I use a standard utilitarian
measure of social welfare, W (·), defined as:
W (a,G) =
∑
i∈N
b× 1
{∑
j
gijaj + ai ≥ 1
}
− c×
∑
i∈N
ai
Note that groups maximize the total social welfare in any equilibrium when all agents in
the network have access to the local public good and the minimum number of agents are
investing. Across all the network structures, equilibria with only two unlinked agents in-
vesting maximizes total welfare for the group (see Table 1).
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Table 1: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Network (equilibrium) Investment Choice W (·)
Line A B C D E
(L1) 1 0 1 0 1 5b− 3c
(L2) 0 1 0 1 0 5b− 2c
(L3) 0 1 0 0 1 5b− 2c
(L4) 1 0 0 1 0 5b− 2c
Asymmetric
(A1) 1 0 1 0 1 5b− 3c
(A2) 0 1 0 0 1 5b− 2c
(A3) 1 0 0 1 0 5b− 2c
Circle
(C1) 1 0 0 1 0 5b− 2c
(C2) 1 0 1 0 0 5b− 2c
(C3) 0 1 0 0 1 5b− 2c
(C4) 0 0 1 0 1 5b− 2c
(C5) 0 1 0 1 0 5b− 2c
See Appendix A for proof and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium profiles.
2.2.1 Network Structures
Since investments are substitutes, adding a link has two opposite effects, it increases
access to the local public good, but, it also increases incentives to free-ride10. Starting
with the Line network adding a link between B & D leads to the Asymmetric network.
This increases the number of neighbors of B and D has. However, adding the link does not
alter the inefficient equilibrium, but it reduces the set of Nash equilibria, which could help
with coordination. It is an empirical question whether an additional link leads to efficiency
gains.
Adding a link between the agents on the periphery of the Line network results in the
Circle network. In the Circle network, theoretically all pure strategy Nash equilibria are
efficient, but the pure strategy Nash set is larger, which might lead to coordination prob-
lems. Given the two countervailing effects of adding a link, it is unclear a priori if it leads
10Galeotti et al. (2010) show that in a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria in a best shot public goods
game with monotone (threshold) strategies, agents invest only if the number of neighbors they have is
below a certain threshold. The threshold decreases as the number of neighbors is increasing.
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to efficiency gains.
Hypothesis 1. The efficiency is the same in Line and Asymmetric networks
and higher in Circle network in the baseline.
2.2.2 Local Cost Sharing Rule
The investment decision of agents with more neighbors disproportionately affects the total
social welfare, since a large number of agents connected to them benefit from their invest-
ment. The local cost sharing rule incentivizes individuals in central positions to invest by
introducing transfers from each of their neighbors who do not invest.
Definition 1. The local cost sharing rule is defined as following:
ui(1,aj ,G) = b− c+ cη
(∑
j∈Ni
(1− aj)
)
ui(0,aj ,G) = b× 1
{∑
j∈Ni
aj ≥ 1
}
− cη
∑
j∈Ni
aj (2)
Where 1 ≥ η > 0 determines the fixed proportion of the cost, an investor receives from
each of her neighbors who choose not to invest.
The local cost sharing incentivizes agents with more neighbors to invest by lowering
the cost of investing via transfers. Conversely the transfers incentivize agents with fewer
neighbors to free-ride. In the baseline given the parameter values11, in the inefficient equi-
librium, the payoff for agents in positions B and D in the Line and Asymmetric network
is 100 (see Table 2). Whereas, with the local cost sharing rule the payoff in the inefficient
equilibrium for B and D is 50; they get a payoff of 100 as they have access to the public
good and transfer 25 to two neighbors who invest. In the Line network the payoff for all
agents in equilibria where either B or D are investing (L3 and L4 see table 2), is higher or
11b = 100, c = 75 and η = 13 .
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equal to the payoff in the inefficient equilibrium. In the Asymmetric network, the ineffi-
cient equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the equilibria in which either B or D is investing
(A2 and A3 see Table 2). In the Asymmetric network the local cost sharing rule creates a
competition between B and D to invest, since in equilibria where either B or D are invest-
ing, the agent who invests gets back the whole cost of provision as a transfer from three of
her neighbors who are not investing, while the agent who is not investing gets a lower pay-
off of 50. This competition leads to the rise of a fourth equilibrium profile in the Asym-
metric network in which only B & D are investing in the group, this equilibrium is efficient
but does not Pareto dominate the inefficient equilibrium since the payoff of C is lower.
Proposition 1. Given the local cost sharing rule and η ≤ 1
3
, the inefficient equilibrium in
the Line and Asymmetric network is Pareto dominated by an efficient equilibrium.12
The local cost sharing rule incentivizes the groups to coordinate away from the inef-
ficient equilibrium to the set of the Pareto dominant efficient equilibria in the Line and
Asymmetric network. Note that the local cost sharing rule does not alter the set of effi-
cient equilibria in the Circle network.
Hypothesis 2. Introducing the local cost sharing rule will increase efficiency in
the Line and Asymmetric networks.
In comparison to the Circle network, the set of Pareto dominant equilibria is the smaller
in the Line and Asymmetric network. The smaller equilibrium set could help to reduce
frictions in coordination, which can lead to higher efficiency.
Hypothesis 3. Given the local cost sharing rule the efficiency in Line and Asym-
metric networks will be higher than in Circle network.
12For proof see Appendix A.3.
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2.2.3 Global Cost Sharing Rule
I base the global cost sharing rule on the component-wise egalitarian allocation rule
discussed in (Jackson, 2005, Page 150). In the global cost sharing rule, the total cost of in-
vestments in the network is divided equally among agents who benefit from the local pub-
lic goods.
Definition 2. The global cost sharing rule is defined as the following:
ui(ai, aj,G) =
b− c×∑Nk ak∑N
k 1
{∑
j∈Nk gkjaj + ak ≥ 1
}
× 1{∑
j∈Ni
gijaj + ai ≥ 1
}
(3)
where
1.
∑N
k ak – the total number of agents who chose to invest,
2.
∑N
k 1
{∑
j∈Nk gkjaj + ak ≥ 1
}
– total number of agents who benefit from the public
good.
The global cost sharing rule aligns an agent’s payoff with the maximum group payoff.
The rule removes incentives to free-ride as well as over-investments for all group members
because the payoff for everyone in the group decreases as the total number of investments
increases. I can rank equilibria based on the total group payoffs. The inefficient equilib-
rium where the maximum number of agents are contributing yields the lowest payoff for
all agents in the network, while any efficient equilibria yield a higher payoff (see, efficiency
coloumn Table 2).
Proposition 2. Given the global cost sharing rule, the inefficient equilibrium in the Line
and Asymmetric network is Pareto dominated by an efficient equilibrium.13
The global cost sharing rule incentivizes groups to coordinate away from the inefficient
equilibrium in the Line and Asymmetric network. The global cost sharing rule in the Cir-
13For proof see Appendix A.3
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cle network by subsidizing the cost of investment reduces the incentive to free-ride com-
pared to the baseline, which can help groups to coordinate and raise efficiency.
Hypothesis 4. In comparison to the game without cost-sharing the efficiency is
higher across all three network structures.
The three network structures can be ranked based on the number of Pareto dominant
Nash equilibria, a smaller set of equilibrium could help groups to coordinate.
Hypothesis 5. With the introduction of the global cost sharing rule, the effi-
ciency will be highest in the Asymmetric network, followed by Line and Circle.
Both cost sharing rules incentivize agents to coordinate on the set of efficient equi-
libria across all network structures. However, the global cost sharing rule induces trans-
fers across unconnected agents even though there are no externalities which flow between
them. This feature of the global cost sharing rule might lead to coordination failure com-
pared to the local cost sharing rule.
2.3 Experiment Design and Procedures
2.3.1 Experiment Game
Experiment design crosses the three network structures: Line, Asymmetric, and Circle
with the baseline and the two cost sharing rules: local cost sharing rule, and the global
cost sharing rule. I implement a finitely repeated version of a best-shot game in stages of
ten rounds. In each stage, subjects interact in groups of five in one of the three network
structures. The subjects know their position in the network. A subject’s position and the
group remains fixed within a stage. Subjects make simultaneous decisions on whether to
invest in the public good. The benefit of the public good is available to everyone in the
neighborhood. The benefit from investing is b = 100 cents, and the cost of investing is
12
c = 75 cents. The payoff for each round in the baseline game is, therefore:
ui(ai,aj ,G) = 100× 1
{∑
j
gijaj + ai ≥ 1
}
− 75× ai (4)
In the two cost sharing treatments, I keep the parameter values of b and c fixed at 100
cents and 75 cents. In the local cost sharing rule the cost sharing parameter η = 1
3
. Thus,
each subject who invests gets a transfer of 25 cents from each of her neighbors who did not
invest in the local public good. The payoff for the subjects in the local cost sharing rule is
given by:
ui(1,aj ,G) = (100− 75) + 25
∑
j∈Ni
(1− aj)
ui(0,aj ,G) = 100× 1
{∑
j∈Ni
aj ≥ 1
}
− 25
∑
j∈Ni
aj (5)
In the global cost sharing rule the total cost of investment is equally divided14 among sub-
jects who benefit from the local public good. The payoff for the subjects of the global cost
sharing rule is given by:
ui(a,G) =
100− 75×∑5k=1 ak∑5
k=1 1
{∑
j∈Nk gkjaj + ak ≥ 1
}
× 1{∑
j∈Ni
gijaj + ai ≥ 1
}
(6)
Table 2 presents the round payoffs across all pure strategy Nash equilibria.
14the cost of one investment is the same as the baseline, 75 cents.
13
Table 2: Theoretical profits in equilibrium for each round.
Profit in cents every round
Network (equi.) Baseline Local Cost Sharing Global Cost Sharing Efficiency
Line A B C D E A B C D E Each Agent
( L1) 25 100 25 100 25 50 50 75 50 50 55 0.79
(L2) 100 25 100 25 100 75 75 50 75 75 70 1
(L3) 100 25 100 100 25 75 75 75 75 50 70 1
(L4) 25 100 100 25 100 50 75 75 75 75 70 1
Asymmetric
(A1) 25 100 25 100 25 50 50 75 50 50 55 0.79
(A2) 100 25 100 100 25 75 100 75 50 50 70 1
(A3) 25 100 100 25 100 50 50 75 100 75 70 1
(A4)* ——————————— 75 75 50 75 75 —– 1
Circle
(C1) 25 100 100 25 100 75 75 75 75 50 70 1
(C2) 25 100 25 100 100 75 50 75 75 75 70 1
(C3) 100 25 100 100 25 50 75 75 75 75 70 1
(C4) 100 100 25 100 25 75 75 75 50 75 70 1
(C5) 100 25 100 25 100 75 75 50 75 75 70 1
*In the Asymmetric network A4 is an equilibrium only in the local cost sharing rule.
2.3.2 Experiment Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the ExCEN lab at Georgia State University in Febru-
ary - March 2018. A total of 240 subjects participated in the experiment over twelve ses-
sions. The subjects were recruited via email using the ExCEN automated system. Upon
arrival at the lab, the subjects reviewed and signed the consent form and were randomly
assigned seats in the lab. Throughout the session, subjects were not allowed to commu-
nicate with each other15. Each session was conducted in three stages, followed by a de-
mographic survey. At the start of each stage, subjects were instructed to read the experi-
mental instruction (see appendix B) at their own pace16. Before the start of each stage in
order to gauge a better understanding of the game, subjects had the option to explore a
game simulator at their own pace; they also played a set of practice rounds. Each session17
lasted for roughly one hour and fifteen minutes.
Subjects only took part in one of the three network structures: Line, Asymmetric,
or Circle. Each session consisted of three stages of ten rounds each. At the start of each
15To ensure privacy, each computer terminal in the lab is enclosed with dividers.
16A summary of instructions was read out loud which was available for subjects to see on their com-
puter screens.
17computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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stage, subjects were randomly matched to form groups of five, and each subject was ran-
domly assigned a network position. The group and the position remained fixed within each
stage. Across stages, treatments were introduced. In the first stage, subjects played the
baseline game, followed by the two cost sharing rules. Across sessions, the order in which
the two cost sharing rules were introduced was randomized.
As explained above, in the baseline treatment, the benefit from an investment in the
neighborhood common fund was 100 cents for all individuals in the neighborhood of the
investor, and the cost was 75 cents. In the local cost sharing rule, each subject who in-
vests receives a transfer of 25 cents from each neighbor who did not invest. The cost shar-
ing rule was enforced after all subjects made their investment decisions. In the global cost
sharing treatment subjects were informed that the benefit of investing was still 100 cents,
but all subjects who received a benefit from the neighborhood common fund would equally
share the cost of total investment.
At the end of every round, the subjects were provided a summary of the number of the
contributing neighbors, their position on the network, their investment decisions and their
earnings; this information was available for all the 30 periods. I chose to repeat the stage
game for ten rounds18 to allow for enough time for groups to understand the game and
coordinate on an equilibrium.
At the end of each session, each subject answered a questionnaire asking on demo-
graphics and some context-specific risk and social preferences questions. Subjects were
paid for all 30 periods in cash privately right after the experiment session. The average
payoff in the experiment was $14.50 per subject, with a minimum of $ 9.60 and maximum
earning of $ 21.60.
18Best response dynamics converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium within at most 2 x N (Ko-
marovsky et al., 2015, Proposition 2); in our case 10 rounds.
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2.4 Results
2.4.1 Efficiency across cost-sharing rules
The two cost sharing rules incentivize groups to coordinate away from the inefficient
equilibrium in the Line and Asymmetric networks. Hypotheses 2 and 4 state that com-
pared to the baseline, the two cost sharing rules will increase efficiency in both the net-
work structures. The set of pure strategy Nash equilibria are efficient in the Circle net-
work; the two cost sharing rules subsidize the cost of investing compared to the baseline.
The lower cost has two countervailing effects in the Circle network; it could lead to an in-
crease in efficiency because of an increase in the provision of the public good or a loss in
efficiency due to over-investment compared to the baseline.
To test the effect of two cost sharing rules on efficiency, first I compute the efficiency
for each round using a traditional measure19. Figure 2 shows efficiency across the rounds
in the baseline and the two cost sharing rules across the three network structures.
Figure 2: Efficiency Across Treatments
Inspecting figure 2 one can observe that in the first round across all the three treat-
19Efficiency = Realized PayoffroundTheoretical Max. Possible Payoff
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ments groups start with similar level of efficiency. In the Line and Circle, compared to
the baseline efficiency is higher in the two cost sharing rules. However, in the Asymmetric
network, the effect of the two cost sharing rules is not clear. To identify the effect of the
two cost sharing rules on the efficiency of provision, I run a linear panel regression model
with efficiency as the dependent variable and a categorical variable for baseline and the
two cost sharing rules as the variable of interest with a random effect at the group level.
To account for learning about the group members due to the repetition of the game, I use
round numbers as a control. Table 320 reports for each network structure the change in ef-
ficiency in the local and the global cost sharing rule compared to the treatment without
cost sharing (baseline).
Table 3: OLS Estimates - Efficiency Across Treatment
Line Asymmetric Circle
Local 0.104*** 0.0625** 0.0982***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Global 0.101*** 0.00748 0.0813**
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032)
Round 0.00825** 0.00799*** 0.0118***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 480 480 480
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In the Line network, the local cost sharing rule increases the efficiency of the play by
17% compared to 59.2% efficiency in the baseline. Compared to the baseline efficiency of
65% in the Asymmetric network, the local cost sharing rule increased efficiency by 9.75%.
The local cost sharing rule increases efficiency by 14.5% in the Circle network. I summa-
rize the effect of the local cost sharing rule on efficiency in the following result.
Result 1. Compared to the baseline, the local cost sharing rule is successful in
raising efficiency across the three network structures.
20I find similar results if I use 1/Round as an independent variable, see Appendix A.2
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Hypothesis 4 states that the global cost sharing rule would increase efficiency in all
three network structures. Compared to the baseline, the global cost sharing rule in the
Line network increases efficiency by 17% and by 12% in the Circle network. However,
there are no gains in efficiency in the Asymmetric network. The following results summa-
rize the findings for the global cost sharing rule.
Result 2. Compared to the baseline, the global cost sharing rule is successful
in raising efficiency in the Line and Circle network structure but it has no ef-
fect on efficiency for Asymmetric network.
Both the local and global cost sharing rules align individual incentives with higher
group efficiency. Unlike the local cost sharing rule, global cost sharing induces transfers
among unlinked agents. The cross-subsidization of investment, even when there is no flow
of externalities could lead to coordination failure since choices of subjects outside their
neighborhood determine an individual’s payoffs. This could lead to lower efficiency in the
global cost sharing rule when compared to the local cost sharing rule. To test if there is
any difference in efficiency between the local and global cost sharing treatments in each
of the network structure, I run a Wald test for equality of the two estimated coefficients.
In the Line and Circle, there is no statistically significant difference between efficiency
in the local and global cost sharing rules; however, in the Asymmetric network, the local
cost sharing rule is successful in raising efficiency compared to the global cost sharing rule
(p = 0.075).
2.4.2 Efficiency across networks
Hypotheses 1, 3, and 5 state differences in efficiency across network structures in the
three treatments: baseline, local cost sharing, and global cost sharing. To test these hy-
potheses, I run a linear panel regression with efficiency as the dependent variable and a
categorical variable for the three network structures as the explanatory variable of interest
with random effects at the group level. To account for learning, I use the round number as
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a control variable. For each treatment: baseline, local cost sharing, and global cost sharing
table 421 reports the differences in efficiency in Asymmetric and Circle comparison to the
Line network.
Table 4: OLS Estimates - Efficiency Across Networks
Baseline Local Global
Baseline (mean) 0.592 0.697 0.693
(.021) (0.016) (0.017)
Asymmetric 0.0585** 0.0165 -0.0349
(0.028) (0.034) (0.030)
Circle 0.0812*** 0.0750** 0.0616**
(0.030) (0.032) (0.030)
Round -0.000974 0.0148*** 0.0142***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 480 480 480
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In the baseline, hypothesis 1 states that the efficiency in the Circle will be higher com-
pared to the Line and Asymmetric networks. Comparing between the Line and Asymmet-
ric networks, there should not be any differences in efficiency if groups coordinate on the
inefficient equilibrium22. However, if a smaller pure strategy Nash equilibrium set can aid
with coordination, then in the Asymmetric, the efficiency could be higher because of lower
coordination failure. The efficiency in the Asymmetric network is 9.8% higher than the
Line network.
The Circle network is 13.7% more efficient compared to the Line network. To compare
the difference in efficiency between the Asymmetric to Circle network, I run a Wald test
with the null hypothesis that the two regression coefficients are equal. I fail to reject the
null hypothesis; there is no statistically significant difference between the efficiency of the
Asymmetric and Circle networks.
21I find similar results if I use 1/Round as an independent variable, see Appendix A.2.
22Charness et al. (2014) find that stochastic stability drives equilibrium selection in best shot games in
a network.
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In the Line and Asymmetric networks, the two cost sharing rules align individual in-
centives with group efficiency. Recall that all equilibria in Circle network are efficient.
However, in both the cost sharing rules compared to the Line and Asymmetric, the set of
Pareto dominant Nash equilibria is the larger in the Circle network. If the larger set makes
it hard for groups to coordinate on an equilibrium, then one might expect a lower level of
efficiency in Circle network, as stated in Hypothesis 3 and 5.
In both the local and global cost sharing rules, the efficiency in Line and Asymmetric
networks are not statistically different from each other. Whereas compared to the Line,
the Circle network is 10% more efficient in the local cost sharing rule and 8.8% more ef-
ficient in the global cost sharing rule. A Wald test of equality of regression coefficient of
Asymmetric and Circle network. The Circle is more efficient than the Asymmetric network
in local cost sharing (p = 0.076) and global cost sharing (p = 0.0003). I summarize these
observations in the following result.
Result 3. The Circle is the most efficient network, with or without the cost
sharing of investments.
2.4.3 What are the sources of inefficiency?
There are two sources of inefficiency: under-provision and over-provision of the local
public good. The welfare loss because of under-provision is higher than overprovision be-
cause the benefits from the public good exceed the cost of provision. Under-provision im-
plies a lack of access to the public good. To capture underprovision of the public good, I
construct the following measure; access to public good, as the ratio between the total num-
ber of subjects in the group who receive a benefit from the public good and total group
size. An increase in access to the public good could lead to over-investment in a round.
To capture over-investment, I define overprovision in a round as a binary variable which
takes the value one if all five group members receive a benefit from the public good but
there are over two investments in the group.
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Figure 3: Sources of Inefficiency
Access to Public Good Overprovison of Public Good
Inspection of Figures 3a and 3b suggests that the two cost sharing rules increase access
to the public good, but they also increase excess investment. Table 523 reports results from
a linear panel regression with access to public and excess provision as the dependent vari-
able and a categorical variable for the three treatments: baseline, local cost sharing, and
global cost sharing as independent variables of interest with random effects at the group
level. I use the round as control variables to account for learning. Across all the network
structures, the two cost sharing rules increase access to the public good, which improves
efficiency. However, greater access comes with overprovision, which lowers efficiency.
Table 5: Access to Public Good and Excess Provision
Access to Public Good Over Provision
Line Asymmetric Circle Line Asymmetric Circle
Local 0.154*** 0.175*** 0.196*** 0.175*** 0.281*** 0.256***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.058) (0.039) (0.051)
Global 0.192*** 0.151*** 0.182*** 0.300*** 0.356*** 0.269***
(0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.069) (0.046) (0.068)
round 0.000379 0.00167 0.00379 -0.00833 -0.00934 -0.0119
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
23I find similar results if I use 1/Round as an independent variable, see Appendix A.2.
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Result 4. The two cost sharing rules increase the access to public good how-
ever that leads to over investment across the three network structures.
2.4.4 What equilibria are groups more likely to coordinate on?
In this section, I look at equilibrium selection. Figure 4 shows the share of observations
consistent with an equilibrium across three network structures. Table 6 reports the per-
centage of group decisions consistent with equilibrium across three network structures.
Figure 4: Share of Rounds Consistent with Equilibrium
Table 6: Frequency of Equilibrium
Network Equilibrium Baseline Local Global
Line
Equilibrium 13% 22% 29%
Inefficient L1 29% 23% 35%
Efficient
L2 10% 3% 24%
L3 10% 9% 22%
L4 52% 66% 20%
Asymmetric
Equilibrium 15% 14% 15%
Inefficient A1 46% 0% 79%
Efficient
A2 38% 45% 8%
A3 17% 5% 13%
A4 – 50% –
Circle
Equilibrium 18% 30% 23%
Efficient
C1 21% 35% 14%
C2 28% 29% 32%
C3 7% 8% 30%
C4 24% 13% 22%
C5 21% 15% 3%
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Inspecting figure 4 shows that the two cost sharing rules increase the number of de-
cisions consistent with an equilibrium in the Line and Circle networks. To further inves-
tigate the effect the two cost sharing rules have on the likelihood of observing an equi-
librium, I run a logistic panel model where the dependent variable in a dummy variable
which takes the value one when a group decision is consistent with equilibrium, and zero
otherwise. The independent variable of interest is the categorical variable for each of the
three treatments: baseline, local cost sharing, and global cost sharing. I also use the round
number to account for learning. Table 724 reports the marginal effect of the two cost shar-
ing rules compared to the baseline for each of the three network structures.
Table 7: Marginal Effect of Probability of Coordinating on Equilibrium
Line Asymmetric Circle
Baseline 0.132 0.153 0.184
(0.031) (0.043) (0.040)
Local 0.0859* -0.0212 0.117*
(0.050) (0.058) (0.063)
Global 0.155*** -0.000941 0.0454
(0.054) (0.060) (0.059)
Round 0.0154** 0.0155*** 0.0227***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 480 480 480
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Table 8: Mean Investment by Position
Baseline Local Cost Sharing Global Cost Sharing
Network A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
Line 57% 26% 36% 39% 44% 66% 44% 44% 56% 45% 61% 55% 46% 56% 66%
Asymmetric 51% 31% 38% 24% 50% 41% 78% 58% 56% 48% 71% 45% 59% 44% 73%
Circle 36% 29% 39% 26% 34% 70% 46% 42% 54% 36% 53% 38% 53% 43% 60%
24I find similar results if I use 1/Round as an independent variable, see Appendix A.2
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Line
In the baseline, 13% of group decisions are consistent with an equilibrium prediction.
Only 29% of the observations are at the inefficient equilibrium. 52% of group decisions
consistent with the equilibrium is the efficient equilibrium where subjects in positions A
and D are investing. The local cost sharing rule increases the likelihood of coordinating
on any equilibrium by 8.6 percentage points (see Table 7). Similar to the baseline in the
local cost sharing rule, 66% of equilibrium profiles are ones where subjects in positions A
and D are investing. The global cost sharing rule increases the probability of coordinating
on equilibrium by 15.5 percentage points, groups are equally likely to coordinate on any of
the four pure strategy equilibrium profile25.
Asymmetric
15% of the group decisions are consistent with an equilibrium prediction in the base-
line. The two cost sharing rules do not increase the likelihood of coordinating on an equi-
librium (see Table 7). However, the two cost sharing rules influence the equilibrium pro-
file groups to coordinate on. In the baseline, groups are coordinating either on inefficient
equilibrium (46%) or on the equilibria where subjects in positions B and E are investing
(38%).The local cost sharing rule induces groups to coordinate away from the inefficient
equilibrium to either the one where B and E are investing or B and D are investing26. In
the global cost sharing rule in 79% of the observation consistent with equilibrium, groups
coordinate on the inefficient equilibrium where A, C, and E are investing.
25Subjects across all nodes are investing on average 57% of rounds (see Table 8).
26This is driven by investment behavior of subjects in position B who invest 78% of rounds (see Table
8).
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Circle
In the baseline 18% of the group decisions are consistent with equilibrium. Groups are
equally likely to coordinate on all equilibria except C3, where B and E are investing27.
The local cost sharing rule increases the likelihood of equilibrium play by 11.7 percent-
age points. Groups are more likely to coordinate on the equilibrium where either A and E
(C1) are investing, or A and C (C2) are investing28. Compared to the baseline, the global
cost sharing rule has no effect on the likelihood of equilibrium play; groups are more likely
to coordinate on C1, C2 and C329.
2.4.5 Effect of cost sharing rule on free-riding behavior
Charness et al. (2014) and Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012) find a negative relationship
between the number of neighbors a subject has and their likelihood of investing in the lo-
cal public good. Figure 5 for the Asymmetric and Line networks shows the average invest-
ment for subjects with one, two, and three neighbors. Examining figure 5 there is evidence
of an inverse relationship between the number of neighbors and likelihood of investing in
both the Line and Asymmetric networks. The two cost sharing rules in the Line network
increase the probability of investment independent of the number of neighbors. In the
Asymmetric network, the local cost sharing rule induces subjects with more neighbors to
invest more than subjects with fewer neighbors, whereas in the global cost sharing rule one
can see the negative relationship between the number of neighbors and their likelihood of
investing.
27This pattern is consistent with the observation that subjects across all nodes are contributing 33% of
the times.
28This is driven by the investment behavior of subjects in position A who invest in 70% of the rounds
(see Table 8).
29Subjects across all positions except on position B are investing 50% of the rounds (Table 8).
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Figure 5: Mean Investment by Neighbors
I further investigate the effect of the two cost sharing rules on the likelihood of invest-
ing in the Asymmetric network30. I run a logistic panel regression where the binary deci-
sion to invest is the dependent variable, and the number of neighbors is the primary vari-
able of interest. In addition to the number of neighbors, I take into account the previous
period decision, the total investments by the neighbors in the previous period, round, ses-
sion fixed effect, and demographic variables – gender and race, and as well as random ef-
fects at the subject level. I report the estimated marginal effect by the number of neigh-
bors in Asymmetric network in Table 931 for the three treatments: baseline, local cost
sharing, and global cost sharing.
30The results for Line network structure are available on request.
31I find similar results if I use 1/Round as an independent variable, see Appendix A.2.
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Table 9: Marginal Effect of Neighbors on Investment
Baseline Local Global
One Neighbor (mean) 0.499 0.386 0.678
(.039) (.049) (.041)
Two Neighbors -0.118* 0.209** -0.0934
(0.072) (0.094) (0.072)
Three Neighbors -0.222*** 0.276*** -0.207***
(0.054) (0.077) (0.077)
# Neighbors invest lag 0.0157 -0.0283 -0.0478*
(0.031) (0.037) (0.027)
Invest lag -0.116*** -0.0629 -0.0662
(0.041) (0.046) (0.043)
Round Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes
Session Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 720 720 720
Robust standard errors in parentheses; p∗ < 0.10, p∗∗ < 0.05, p∗∗∗ < 0.010
In the baseline, subjects with two neighbors and subjects with three neighbors are 23%
and 44% less likely to invest compared to subjects with one neighbor. Comparing subjects
with two or three neighbors, I find no statistically significant difference between the likeli-
hood of investing (p = 0.1490).
The local transfer rule incentivizes subjects with more neighbors to invest in the local
public good. Subjects with three neighbors are 71% more likely to invest compared to sub-
jects with one neighbor.
The global cost sharing rule aligns individual incentive with total social welfare, but
unlike the local cost sharing rule it does not directly induces individuals with more neigh-
bors to invest.. The subsidized cost of investment could lead to over provision of the pub-
lic good in the network. In global cost sharing, the subjects with three neighbors are 30%
less likely to invest compared to subjects with one neighbor.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study a repeated best shot public goods game in three network struc-
tures. The primary aim of the chapter is to test mechanisms that can raise the total social
welfare. I introduce two cost sharing rules and show theoretically that the inefficient equi-
librium in the Line, and Asymmetric network is Pareto dominated by an efficient equilib-
rium. I used a laboratory experiment to test the empirical validity of the theoretical pre-
dictions. Compared to the baseline, which is mired by under-provision of the public good,
the two cost sharing rules are successful in increasing access to the public good. However,
the increase in access leads to over-investment, which leads to a loss in efficiency. The lo-
cal cost sharing rule increases efficiency across all network structures, whereas global cost
sharing is successful in increasing efficiency only in the Line and Circle networks.
These findings have implications for policy interventions that involve costly investment
decisions and have local positive externalities. Examples include the adoption of new farm-
ing techniques or making expensive time investments to adopt new medical practices. It
is imperative not only to identify the central players who can help with diffusion but also
provide incentives in the form of cost sharing rules which lower the cost of experimenta-
tion and increase take-up of new products and technology. The local cost sharing rule is
successful in raising efficiency across the three network structures. To implement the lo-
cal cost sharing rule, it suffices to know the maximum degree for any network structure
to calibrate the cost sharing proportion. There is evidence from field experiments in India
that social networks can be effectively used to implement and uphold contracts (Breza and
Chandrasekhar, 2019). Implementing the local cost rule in large networks might be proce-
durally cumbersome. For a larger network structures, the global cost sharing rule might be
more effective since it is easy to implement, and it can help with increasing access to local
public goods although there is over-investment in the public good.
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3 Communication Architectures in Public Goods Games
in Network32
3.1 Introduction
Geographical boundaries and pre-existing social structures are important determinants
of cooperation among individuals. Both field studies and artifactual field experiments find
evidence that merely the knowledge of presence of individuals from different social groups
in the decision group can lead to lower levels of cooperation (Cardenas, 2000, Hoff and
Pandey, 2006, Cox et al., 2018). There is ample evidence which suggests that asymme-
tries in social structures can lead to persistent under-provision of local public goods, which
disproportionately affects individuals in the periphery (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005, Banerjee
and Somanathan, 2007, Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2018).
Thus, it is important to study the effect of asymmetries that arise from natural and so-
cial constraints on investments in public goods with local externalities. Social network the-
ory provides a rich theoretical framework that allows for studying how different network
structures influence equilibrium coordination (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007, Bramoullé
et al., 2014). Multiplicity of equilibria is a central feature of games in networks. One of
the key predictions of the theoretical literature is that stable equilibrium profiles often
are inefficient because of over-investment in the local public good (Bramoullé and Kran-
ton, 2007, Boncinelli and Pin, 2012). The experimental literature on the effect of net-
work structure on public good provision confirms this result. Charness et al. (2014) and
Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2012) find an inverse relationship between the number of neigh-
bors and the likelihood of investing in the public good. Another robust finding is that
stochastic stability governs equilibrium selection33 (Rosenkranz and Weitzel, 2012, Char-
32I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Vjollca Sadiraj, James Cox, David J Cooper, and
Tom Mroz for their valuable feedback. Feedback from participants at the Fourth and Fifth Network Sci-
ence and Economics Conference, and the Southern Economic Association Annual Meetings in 2016. The
experiments were funded through the Andrew Young School Dissertation Fellowship.
33Only 3% of the groups are consistent with a Nash equilibrium (Rosenkranz and Weitzel, 2012).
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ness et al., 2014).
Communication between group members could act as a coordination device aiding
groups to coordinate away from inefficient provision of local public goods. There is a vast
literature that suggests that communication can play a critical role in sustaining cooper-
ation in the provision of public goods game (Ledyard, 1995, Chaudhuri, 2011). There is
also evidence that communication networks can enhance efficiency in coordination games
(Korkmaz et al., 2018, Choi and Lee, 2014)34. Brandts et al. (2019) find that compared to
restricted chat unrestricted communication is more effective as a coordination device35.
In this chapter, I report an experiment designed to test the relative efficacy of two pre-
play communication architectures in resolving inefficiencies in a best shot public goods
game across three network structures (see Figure 6). Prior to choosing an action in the
underlying game, group members engage in an unrestricted text chat in the following two
communication structure: the first is a global architecture where all group members can
communicate with each other. The second is a local architecture where only connected
group members can talk. For example, in the local architecture individual at position A in
the Line and Asymmetric network can only communicate with position B, whereas, in the
Circle network, she can communicate with B and E.
Figure 6: Network Structures in the Experiment
Line
D
C
EA
B
Asymmetric
D
C
EA
B
Circle
D
C
EA
B
34See Choi et al. (2016) for a review of the literature
35Palfrey et al. (2017) presents both theoretical and experimental results that unrestricted text chat is
more effective in raising efficiency in threshold public goods games.
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There are two sources of inefficiency in the provision of the public good: (i) under-
provision, where not all group member receive the benefit from the public good because
of underinvestment, and (ii) over-provision, where the public good is provided at exces-
sive cost. Although the commitments made in the pre-play communication are not bind-
ing, given the best reply function these are self enforcing36. These commitments can help
reduce strategic uncertainty and increase efficiency by dissuading both under and overin-
vestment in the following way. First, it can help gain information about their neighbors’
decisions, which can enhance local coordination. Second, Nash equilibrium requires un-
connected group members to coordinate their actions. Communication can lead to better
group coordination.
I find that introducing pre-play communication increases access to the local public
good from 74% in the baseline with no communication to 90% across the three network
structures. The increase in the provision of the public good does not come at the cost of
overinvestment in the public good; the rate of overinvestment goes down. Comparing
across network structures, in the absence of communication I find the Circle network is
more efficient which is consistent with the previous research (Fatas et al., 2010, Carpen-
ter et al., 2012, Rosenkranz and Weitzel, 2012, Leibbrandt et al., 2015, Boosey and Isaac,
2016). However with communication these differences dissipate. Consistent with earlier
research (Charness et al., 2014, Rosenkranz and Weitzel, 2012) in the baseline I find a neg-
ative relationship between the number of neighbors an individual has and their likelihood
of investing. Communication is successful is breaking this negative relationship.
This chapter contributes to the experimental literature on pre-play communication, see
Crawford (1998), Brandts et al. (2019) for a related survey of the literature. I present evi-
dence regarding the effectiveness of different communication structures on coordination in
games of strategic substitutes in networks. To my best knowledge, the focus of both theo-
retical and experimental research has been on games of strategic complements (Choi et al.,
36see Proposition 3
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2016). This chapter also contributes to the growing literature studying the effect of net-
work structures on public goods provision 37.
There are few studies of mechanisms that can incentivize individuals in the central po-
sitions to invest. Caria and Fafchamps (2018) report results from an artifactual field ex-
periment with farmers in India, where they use expectations of the periphery players as
the mechanism to induce pro-social behavior. They find that individuals in the center of
a star network reciprocate the expectations of the subjects in the periphery. However, the
investment of the center is constrained by the expectation of the periphery players, which
could be suboptimal. I contribute to this literature by studying two unstructured com-
munication architectures that can motivate individuals in a central position to make a
pro-social investment decision, and the expectations of the periphery do not restrict the
choices of subjects. I find that groups in the non-symmetric networks show a preference
for both equity and efficiency.
In the next section, I present a theoretical analysis and derive testable hypotheses. Sec-
tion 3.3 presents the experimental design and procedures. The empirical results are pre-
sented in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Analysis
Let the set of agents be N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i simultaneously chooses to ei-
ther invest (1) or not invest (0) in a local public good. Let a = (a1, . . . , an) denote the
action profile of all agents, where ai ∈ {0, 1} is agent i’s action. Agent i’s action affects
her payoff as well as the payoffs of the agents to whom she is linked through positive ex-
ternalities. Agents are assigned on a undirected graph. Any two agents i and j who share
a local public good are represented by a link: gij = gji = 1. For two agents who are not
linked gij = gji = 0. Let the collection of all links be represented by n × n matrix G. Let
Ni denote the set of agents who are directly linked to agent i, called agent i’s neighbors :
37(Fatas et al., 2010, Carpenter et al., 2012, Rosenkranz and Weitzel, 2012, Leibbrandt et al., 2015,
Charness et al., 2014, Boosey and Isaac, 2016, Caria and Fafchamps, 2018)
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Ni = {j ∈ N/i : gij = 1}. Agents i’s neighborhood is defined as herself and the set of her
neighbors; i.e., {i} ∪Ni.
An agent gets a benefit of b from the local public good if she or any of her direct neigh-
bors’ choose to invest. The cost of providing the local public good, c, is positive but smaller
than b. Let aj denote the set of actions of all agents j 6= i. An agent i’s payoff is the fol-
lowing:
ui(ai,aj ,G) = b× 1
{∑
j
gijaj + ai ≥ 1
}
− c× ai (7)
It is straightforward to show that each agent i’s best reply is: ai = 1 if no one in the
neighborhood invests and (ii) ai = 0, if at least one of her neighbors invest.
I consider three networks of five agents – Line, Asymmetric, and Circle (see Figure 6).
Table 10 reports the pure strategy Nash equilibria for each network structure. One of the
central features of this game is the multiplicity of equilibria. Boncinelli and Pin (2012) use
the notion of stochastic stability to refine the equilibrium set. Boncinelli and Pin (2012)
shows that if both investing and not investing agents randomize or follow a logistic best
response, then the only stochastically stable states are Nash equilibria in which the largest
number of unlinked agents are investing. Charness et al. (2014) reports evidence in favor
of stochastic stability (Boncinelli and Pin, 2012).
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Table 10: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Network (equilibrium) Investment Choice W (·)
Line A B C D E
(L1) 1 0 1 0 1 5b− 3c
(L2) 0 1 0 1 0 5b− 2c
(L3) 0 1 0 0 1 5b− 2c
(L4) 1 0 0 1 0 5b− 2c
Asymmetric
(A1) 1 0 1 0 1 5b− 3c
(A2) 0 1 0 0 1 5b− 2c
(A3) 1 0 0 1 0 5b− 2c
Circle
(C1) 1 0 0 1 0 5b− 2c
(C2) 1 0 1 0 0 5b− 2c
(C3) 0 1 0 0 1 5b− 2c
(C4) 0 0 1 0 1 5b− 2c
(C5) 0 1 0 1 0 5b− 2c
See appendix B for proof
To analyze the welfare implications of different equilibria, I use a standard utilitarian
measure of social welfare, W (·), defined as:
W (a,G) =
∑
i∈N
b× 1
{∑
j
gijaj + ai ≥ 1
}
− c×
∑
i∈N
ai
Note that groups maximize the total social welfare when all agents in the network have
access to the local public good, and the minimum number of agents are investing. In all
the network structures group welfare is maximized when two unlinked agents are investing
in equilibrium (see table 10).
Before playing the public goods game, the players engage in pre-play communication,
referred to as the communication stage. Pre-play communication is cheap talk in the usual
sense that the commitments are not enforceable and payoff-irrelevant. I study the follow-
ing two communication architectures. First, is a global architecture where all group mem-
bers can communicate. Second is a local architecture, where only agents connected to each
other in the underlying game can communicate with each other.
Although commitments made during the pre-play communication stage are not bind-
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ing, these commitments are self-enforcing. Suppose agent i commits to invest, then know-
ing her intentions the best reply for all her neighbors is to not invest. If agent i chooses
not to invest, she will earn 0 since her neighbors are not investing. So, she is better off in-
vesting and getting b− c. Similar arguments can be made for agent i’s commitment to not
investing.
Proposition 3. Commitments made in the communication stage are self-enforcing38.
The Nash equilibrium profile is characterized by the maximal independent set39. Thus,
Nash profiles require coordination on investments of unconnected agents in the network.
Since payoffs are determined by an agent’s own action, and the action of their direct neigh-
bors, the choices of agents who are not connected are not directly observable, which can
lead to coordination failure.
The global communication architecture allows for a complete information network. All
agents have the option to gain and verify information about the choices of all group mem-
bers. This could lead to lower coordination failures, which can lead to an increase in effi-
ciency.
In the local architecture, agents can only communicate with their neighbors. In the
three network structures, agents can form coalitions and share information among all group
members (Myerson, 1977). At the least, local communication architecture can help with
local coordination, which can raise the efficiency of provision.
Hypothesis 6. Compared to the baseline, the efficiency in both communication
structures will be higher.
The two communication architectures do not alter the Nash equilibria set. Given the
repeated nature of the game, some strategies can raise the efficiency of provision.
38Proof in the appendix B
39An independent set of a graph is a set of agents such that no two agents who belong to the set are
linked. See Theorem 1 Bramoullé and Kranton (2007).
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In the Line network, groups can alternate between agents in positions {B,D} and {A,C,E}
investing across rounds. If this history is not observed, agents in positions {A,C,E} switch
to not invest for the rest of the rounds. In the Asymmetric network, groups can increase
efficiency and equity by alternating between the three pure strategies Nash equilibrium. If
groups care only about efficiency in both the Line and Asymmetric network across rounds,
agents in position {A,D}, and {B,E} can take turns to invest. In the Circle network, all
the Nash equilibria are efficient, and alternating between the five pure strategies Nash
equilibrium can raise equity while maintaining efficiency.
If all group members use these strategies then any unilateral deviations by agents will
yield a lower payoff. The strategy in the Line network where agents in positions {B,D}
and {A,C,E} alternate, there is a credible threat by agents in the periphery to enforce the
max-min payoff of b− c on the central agents by not investing for the rest of the rounds.
Hypothesis 7. The two communication architectures will incentivize groups to
utilize repeated game strategies across all network structures.
Comparing across the three network structures, the Circle network has the largest set
of Nash equilibria followed by Line and Asymmetric. However, the Line and Asymmetric
networks have one stochastically stable Nash equilibrium profile. A larger equilibrium set
can lead to a loss in the efficiency of provision because of coordination failure. In the Line
and Asymmetric networks, if groups coordinate on the stable equilibrium40 there should
not be any difference in the efficiency across them.
The global architecture has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, it can be more
effective, since all agents can communicate and verify information. However, all group
members communicating can overwhelm which can lead to coordination failures. Local
structure restricts communication between only neighbors; the focused nature of the archi-
tecture can help with better local coordination. However, coordination on Nash equilibria
requires unconnected agents to coordinate their investment decisions, which is not readily
40As observed in Charness et al. (2014).
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available in local communication. It is an open empirical question of how these two com-
munication architectures interact with the three network structures.
Hypothesis 8. Efficiency is the same in Line and Asymmetric networks and
higher in Circle network.
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedure
I conducted the experiment at the ExCEN lab at Georgia State University from June
to November 2018. 180 subjects took part in the experiment over 12 sessions. I recruited
the subjects via email using the ExCEN automated system. Upon arrival at the lab, the
subjects reviewed and signed the consent form and were randomly assigned seats in the
lab. Each session was conducted in three stages, followed by a demographic survey. At the
start of each stage, subjects were instructed to read the experimental instruction (see ap-
pendix B) at their pace41. Before the start of each stage, to gauge a better understanding
of the game, subjects had the option to explore a game simulator at their own pace; they
also played a set of practice rounds. Each session42 lasted for roughly one hour and fifteen
minutes.
Subjects only participated in one of the three network structure: Line, Asymmetric,
or Circle. Each session consisted of three stages of ten rounds each. At the start of each
stage, subjects were randomly matched to form groups of five, and each subject was ran-
domly assigned a network position. The group members and the position of subjects re-
mained fixed within each stage. Across stages, treatments were introduced. In the first
stage, subjects played the game without communication, followed by the two communi-
cation architectures. Across sessions, the order in which the two communication architec-
tures were introduced was randomized.
The benefit from an investment in the neighborhood common fund was 100 cents for
41A summary of instructions was read out loud which was available for subjects to see on their com-
puter screens.
42Computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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all individuals in the investor’s neighborhood, and the cost was 75 cents. In both stages
with communication, there was a one-minute communication period before making an in-
vestment decision. In global communication treatment, all group members could communi-
cate, whereas in the local communication treatment subjects could communicate with only
their neighbors.
At the end of every round, the subjects were provided a summary of the number of the
contributing neighbors, their position on the network, their investment decisions and their
earnings; this information was available for all 30 periods. I repeated the stage game for
ten rounds43 to allow for enough time for groups to understand the game and coordinate
on an equilibrium.
At the end of each session, each subject answered a questionnaire on demographics
and some context-specific risk and social preferences questions. Subjects were paid for all
the 30 periods in cash privately right after the experiment session. The average payoff in
the experiment was $16.10 per subject, with a minimum of $9 and maximum earning of
$26.75.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Efficiency across communication architecture
The two communication architectures do not alter the set of Nash equilibrium. How-
ever, communication can reduce strategic uncertainty. The commitments made in the pre-
play communication stage are self-enforcing. Suppose a subject commits to investing; the
best reply for all her neighbors is not to invest. If she reneges on her commitment, she
will earn a zero for that round, so she is better off investing. Thus, communication can
enhance efficiency by lowering coordination failures.
Hypothesis 6 predicts that compared to the baseline, the two communication treat-
43Best response dynamics converge to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium within at most 2 × N (Ko-
marovsky et al., 2015, Proposition 2); in our case 10 rounds.
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ments improve the efficiency of public good provision. To test this hypothesis, I define effi-
ciency using a traditional measure44. Comparing the distribution of efficiency across treat-
ments for each of the network structures introducing communication enhances efficiency
across all network structures45 (see Figure 7).
Figure 7: Cumulative Distribution of Efficiency
Figure 8: Efficiency Across Rounds
44Efficiency = Realized PayoffroundTheoretical Max. Payoff
45I conduct am analysis using the 1/round as a dependent variable and in a separate analysis only use
periods 5-10 and find the similar results (please see Appendix B.2.1 and B2.2 ).
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Given the repeated nature of the game, learning about the group can help with coor-
dination; across the rounds, there are changes in efficiency (see Figure 8). To estimate the
effect of the two communication architecture on efficiency, I estimate a random effect GLS
model. I perform separate estimations for each of the network structures. The model for
each network structure is:
Eit =
3∑
k=1
βkC
k + κRound+ εit (8)
where Eit is the group i’s efficiency in period t, CK indicates the communication treat-
ment variable, where C1 is the no communication treatment, C2 is the global architecture,
and C3 is the local architecture. I use the round number as a control for learning. Table
1146 reports changes in efficiency with respect to the C1, the treatment without communi-
cation.
Table 11: Efficiency Across Treatment
Line Asymmetric Circle
Global 0.214*** 0.161*** 0.101***
(0.041) (0.036) (0.027)
Local 0.220*** 0.163*** 0.155***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.034)
Round 0.00924** 0.00744** 0.00625**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 360 360 360
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Across the three network structures compared to the baseline, both the global and lo-
cal communication structures lead to an increase in efficiency. However, when comparing
the between the two communication architectures, I find no statistically significant dif-
46I conduct am analysis using the 1/round as a dependent variable and in a separate analysis only use
periods 5-10 and find the similar results (please see Appendix B.2.1 and B2.2 ).
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ferences47. An increase in access48 can drive the gain in efficiency. At the same time, an
increase in access could lead to overprovision49 of the public good which impedes efficiency.
Introducing the communication architectures increases access to the public good from 75%
to 90% across the network structure. Increase in access is not coupled with overinvest-
ment. In fact, local communication lowers excess investment in Circle network (see figure
9a and 9b).
Figure 9: Sources of Inefficiency
Access to Public Good Overprovison of Public Good
Result 5. The two communication architectures enhance efficiency across all network
structures by increasing access to the local public good.
Individuals with more neighbors get the highest payoff in the inefficient equilibrium.
If subjects care only about maximizing their payoffs, then individuals in positions B and
D will commit to not investing in the communication stage. Since commitments are self-
enforcing, the efficiency in the Line and Asymmetric network would be lower compared to
the Circle where all Nash equilibria are efficient. Hypothesis 8 predicts the Circle network
to be more efficient. To estimate the effect of the network structure has on efficiency, sim-
ilar to specification (8), I estimate a random effect GLS model for each of the treatments.
47I fail to reject the null hypothesis of the Wald test of equality of the coefficients.
48I measure access to the public good as the ratio between the total number of subjects in the group
who receive a benefit and total group size.
49I define overprovision in a round as a binary variable which takes the value one if all five group mem-
bers receive a benefit from the public good but there are over two investments in the group.
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The model for each treatment is:
Eit =
3∑
k=1
βkN
k + κRound+ εit (9)
where Eit is the group i’s efficiency in period t, NK indicates the network treatment
variable, where N1 is the Line, N2 is the Asymmetric, and N3 is the Circle network. I
control for learning by using the round number as a measure. The results in Table 1250
report changes in the efficiency with respect to the N1 the line network.
Table 12: Efficiency Across Network
Baseline Local Global
Line (mean) 0.606 0.821 0.826
(0.025) (0.017) (.019)
Asymmetric 0.0667* 0.0131 0.0101
(0.037) (0.035) (0.034)
Circle 0.0774** -0.0357 0.0131
(0.037) (0.039) (0.031)
Round 0.00535 0.00930*** 0.00829***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Observations 360 360 360
Robust standard errors in parentheses; p∗ < 0.10, p∗∗ < 0.05, p∗∗∗ < 0.010
In the baseline treatment compared to Line, both the Asymmetric and Circle networks
are more efficient. However, with communication, I find no statistically significant differ-
ence between the three network structures. In Line and Asymmetric networks, groups
achieve 83% efficiency across both the communication architectures, which is higher that
the efficiency of coordinating on the inefficient equilibrium51. This suggest that subjects’
when making their decision have both efficiency and equity52 concerns. Compared to the
50I conduct am analysis using the 1/round as a dependent variable and in a separate analysis only use
periods 5-10 and find the similar results (please see Appendix B.2.1 and B2.2 ).
51 5×100−3×75
5×100−2×75 ≈ 79%
52I use Gini as a measure of inequality
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baseline, communication across all network structures lead to an increase in both total
group payoff and lead to a more equitable distribution of earnings among subjects (see
Figure 10 and Table 13). Across the three network structure the efficient equilibrium pro-
files are the ones in which two unconnected neighbors are investing and everyone in the
group receive a benefit from the public good. If groups learn to alternate between them,
this can increase both efficiency and equity. I explore equilibrium selection in the next sec-
tion.
Table 13: Total Profit – By Type
Line Asymmetric Circle
Position Baseline Global Local Baseline Global Local Baseline Global Local
A 337.5 556.2 558.3 264.6 518.8 464.6 639.6 545.8 589.6
B 466.7 612.5 600.0 750.0 614.6 677.1 356.2 568.8 597.9
C 479.2 597.9 625.0 431.2 625.0 681.2 437.5 577.1 618.8
D 497.9 579.2 600.0 587.5 618.8 602.1 575.0 502.1 545.8
E 341.7 527.1 508.3 322.9 541.7 502.1 385.4 554.2 585.4
Total 2123.0 2872.9 2891.6 2356.2 2918.9 2927.1 2393.7 2748.0 2937.5
Figure 10: Lorenz Curve
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Result 6. Communication aids groups towards more equitable and efficient payoffs and
mitigates differences in efficiency across the three network structures.
3.4.2 Equilibrium Selection
Table 1453 reports the share of observations consistent with a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium predictions54.
Table 14: Frequency of Equilibrium
Baseline Global Local
Line
Not an equilbria 79% 31% 30%
L1 - A, C, & E 7% 29% 27%
L2 - B & D 4% 35% 30%
L3 - B & E 3% 3% 8%
L4 - A & E 7% 3% 6%
Asymmetric
Not an equilbria 85% 63% (46%) 61% (52%)
A1 - A, C, & E 5% 13% (13%) 12% (12%)
A2 - B & E 5% 10% (10%) 13% (13%)
A3 - A & D 5% 13% (13%) 14% (14%)
A4* - B & D 0% (18%) (9%)
Circle
Not an equilbria 83% 62% 50%
C1 - A & D 3% 8% 12%
C2 - A & C 0% 8% 9%
C3 - B & E 8% 8% 10
C4 - C & E 3% 6% 11%
C5 - B & D 3% 8% 8%
*Behavioral Equilibrium - B & D invest
The commitments made in the pre-play communication stage are non-binding and
have no direct effect on the payoff. However, they add to the information available to sub-
jects before they decide. The global structure has two countervailing effects. On the one
hand, it can be more effective in reinforcing a common prior among all group members
aiding coordination. But on the other hand, all group members communicating can be
overwhelming, which can lead to coordinate failures. In the local structure there is more
53 The equilibrium coordination in periods 5 - 10 and find the similar results (please see Appendix
B.2.2 )
54Note that in the Asymmetric network B and D investing although is not a Nash equilibrium but
groups consistently coordinate on this action profile
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focused communication among neighbors, which can help with better coordination. How-
ever, group members are not aware of the decision of other group members. Since coordi-
nation depends on the actions of the unconnected subjects in the group, the lack of infor-
mation can lead to failure to achieve a Nash equilibrium. It is an open empirical question,
which one would lead to better coordination.
In the baseline, with no communication across all network structures, only 17.5% of
the observations are consistent with an equilibrium prediction. The two communication
architecture across the three network structures lead to an increase in the likelihood of
coordinating on a Nash equilibrium profile. The rate of coordination on an equilibrium in-
creases over two-and-a-half times in the Line and Asymmetric network, and over one and
half times in the Circle network (see Table 26 in Appendix B2 ). However, there is no sta-
tistically significant difference between the two communication architectures55.
Comparing the three network structures, in the Line and Asymmetric network if indi-
viduals care only about their payoffs, subjects in position B and D would commit to not
invest which maximize their payoff. As a result groups could be more likely to coordinate
on the inefficient equilibrium. In the Circle network, although all Nash equilibria are effi-
cient, the set is the larger. A larger set might lead to mis-coordination.
Groups in the Line network across both the communication architectures are more suc-
cessful in coordinating on a pure strategy Nash profile. In the global architecture groups
compared to Line, groups in the Asymmetric and Circle networks, are 50% less likely to
coordinate on an equilibrium profile. However, in contrast to the global, the local commu-
nication helps with coordination in the Circle network. In comparison to the Line network,
the groups in the Asymmetric and Circle network are 42% and 28% less likely to coordi-
nate on an equilibrium see Table 27).
Across the three network structures and treatments, groups coordinate on several equi-
librium profiles (see Figure 11). Consistent with hypothesis 7 the communication architec-
55I fail to reject the null hypothesis of the Wald test of equality of the coefficients.
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tures lead to a discernible pattern of investment across rounds in the Line and Asymmetric
networks, suggesting a repeated game dynamic. These dynamics vary across the three net-
work structures.
Figure 11: Equilibrium
Table 15: Markov Transition Matrix – Between Equilibrium Profiles
Baseline Global Communication Local Communication
Line
No L1 L2 L3 L4 No L1 L2 L3 L4 No L1 L2 L3 L4
No 0.77 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.54 0.13 0.26 0.03 0.05 0.41 0.13 0.28 0.08 0.10
L1 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.06 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.76 0.03 0.03
L2 0.91 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.28 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00
L3 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25
L4 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.13 0.00 0.63 0.00
Asymmetric
No A1 A2 A3 A4 No A1 A2 A3 A4 No A1 A2 A3 A4
No 0.86 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.48 0.08 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.50 0.08 0.21 0.13 0.08
A1 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.69 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.36
A2 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.18 0.09 0.27 0.00 0.64 0.07 0.00 0.29 0.00
A3 0.71 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.19 0.19 0.00
A4 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.53 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.57 0.00 0.07 0.07
Circle
No C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 No C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 No C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
No 0.82 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.67 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.50 0.14 0.09 0.08 0.13 0.06
C1 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.08 0.08
C2 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.22 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.36
C3 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.80 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.07 0.07
C4 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.64 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
C5 0.86 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.13 0.38 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.00 0.38 0.00
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Line
With global architecture, 83% of the groups learn to alternate between equilibrium pro-
files where: (i) subjects in positions A, C, and E (L1) invest and (ii) subjects in positions
B, and D (L2) invest. Coordination on L1 and L2 make up 93% of the observations con-
sistent with an equilibrium. 94% of the observations which start off in L1 transition to L2,
and, 77% of the observations which start off in L2 transition to L1 (see Table 15 and Fig-
ure 25). The switching between L1 and L2 equilibrium addresses concerns of equity and
efficiency. In all other efficient equilibrium profiles, the subjects in position C always free
rides on the investment of B and D. If subjects care about inequality then coordinating
between L2, L3, L4 profiles although is efficient, favors the payoff of C. Coordinating on
the stochastically stable profile, L1, would lead to greater levels of inequity in the group
since subjects in positions B and D receive the highest payoffs. The global communication
subjects in positions A, C, and E form a majority and together can change the status quo
of the stochastic stable equilibrium by deciding to not invest which forces B and D to in-
vest. Alternating between L1 and L2 is an α − stable allocation56 if subjects in the group
make network-based relative income comparisons (Cheng and Xing, 2018).
Similar to the pattern in global architecture, in the local communication groups coordi-
nate on L1 and L2 (see Table 15). Over 72% of the observations start at L1 transition to
L2 and vice versa (see Table 15). Local architecture gives subjects at C a central position
in the communication network. C acts as an information bridge between B and D, which
is critical for coordination on any efficient equilibrium profiles. Two groups where C ex-
ploits their central position consistently alternate between two equilibrium profiles, where
B and E invest (L3) and A and B invest (L4) (see Figure 25).
56An allocation is stable if it is not revoked under α-majority voting; that is, there exists no alternative
allocation, such that a fraction of at least α of the population have their rankings strictly improved under
the alternative. In this case, α = 0.5.
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Asymmetric
In the global communication, in addition to the three pure strategy Nash equilibrium
profiles, 18% of group decisions are consistent with an action profile where B and D are in-
vesting (A4). Four out of twelve groups consistently alternate between A, C, and E (A1)
investing and A4 (see Figure 26). One group57 learns to alternate between the two efficient
equilibria, where in one round A and D invests (A2) and the next round B and E invest
(A3). One group58 is successful in rotating between the three pure strategy Nash equilib-
rium profiles. Unlike, the Line network groups in the Asymmetric network groups do not
have access to a clear focal strategy to alternate between two Nash equilibria which can
address both efficiency and equity concerns. A4 is not enforceable since subjects in B and
D can make the same payoff by taking turns among themselves. Alternating between the
two efficient equilibrium (A2 and A3) renders higher payoff to subjects in position C. In
this network, it is harder for groups to address both efficiency and equity concerns which
leads to frequent mis-coordinations.
With local communication, the number of observations consistent with A4 falls in half
to 9%. Only two groups consistently alternate between A1 and A4. Groups value overall
efficiency as reflected in frequent coordination on A2 and A4 (see Figure 11 and Table 15).
Circle
The circle network has the largest pure strategy Nash equilibrium set, which can over-
whelm groups negotiating to coordinate on across the ten rounds. In global communica-
tion, only half of the groups were successful in alternating or successively coordinating on
an equilibrium. In contrast, local architecture leads to higher levels of coordination, sug-
gesting that restricted communication helps with coordination on any equilibrium. There
is substantial heterogeneity among groups to discern a common pattern. The groups suc-
57Group 3 see Figure 26
58Group 12 see Figure 26
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cessful in coordinating on equilibria were equally likely to coordinate on any of the five
pure strategy equilibrium (see Table 15).
Result 7. Both communication architectures lead to a higher rate of coordination on the
set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. However, there is substantial heterogeneity across the
three network structures on equilibrium profiles groups coordinate on.
3.4.3 Do subjects learn from their neighbors?
Equilibrium coordination depends on the actions of unconnected agents. Communi-
cation can help with easing coordination failure. The average best reply increases with
implementation of the two communication structures (see Figure 12, consistent belief).
Absent communication, across all network structures more than half of the subjects based
their decisions on their neighbor’s action in the previous round. The proportion of groups
giving myopic best reply falls after introducing communication (see Figure 12, myopic best
reply).
Figure 12: Group Best Reply Rate
Consistent Belief Myopic Best Reply
Recall, the best reply is to invest if no one in the neighborhood invests and to not in-
vest if at least one of her neighbors invests. To estimate the effect of the two communi-
cation architecture on how subjects in the game respond, I estimate a random effect GLS
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model. I perform separate estimations for subjects grouped according to their position59 in
the network. The model for each group is:
investit =
3∑
k=1
βkC
k + δ1{
∑
j∈Ni
aj ≥ 1}+
3∑
k=1
ζkC
k × 1{
∑
j∈Ni
aj ≥ 1}+ ηXi + εit (10)
where investit is the investment decision of subject i in period t, CK indicates the com-
munication treatment variable, where C1 is the no communication treatment, C2 is the
global architecture, and C3 is the local architecture. 1{∑j∈Ni aj ≥ 1} is an indicator func-
tion which takes the value one if at least one of subject i’s neighbors invest. Xi includes
controls for last period decision, round , session fixed effect, and demographic variables –
gender and race.
Compared to the baseline, subjects on average are investing more in the two communi-
cation structures across all network structures (see Table 1660. The low level of investment
in the treatment without communication is consistent with the conclusion that under-
provision of the public good leads to lower efficiency without communication. In the ab-
sence of strategic uncertainty, all subjects give the best reply to their neighbors across the
baseline and the two communication architectures, which implies δ = −1 therefore ζk = 0.
A negative coefficient of ζ implies that communication helps in reducing strategic uncer-
tainty. I find that subjects compared to the baseline are less likely to invest when at least
one of their neighbors invest in the two communication treatments (see Table 16). These
findings suggest that the consistency of belief about neighbors’ play increases with commu-
nication.
59In the Line and Asymmetric network, there are three groups: A & E, C, and, B &D.
60I conduct a similar analysis using the 1/round as a dependent variable and find the similar results
(please see Appendix B.2.1 )
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Table 16: Effect of Communication on Investment Decision
Line Asymmetric Circle
A & E C B & D A & E C B & D All
Global 0.270*** 0.459*** 0.426*** 0.243*** -0.0310 0.579*** 0.107
(0.094) (0.145) (0.081) (0.076) (0.154) (0.134) (0.067)
Local 0.215** 0.443*** 0.393*** 0.148* 0.0397 0.558*** 0.215***
(0.102) (0.130) (0.075) (0.086) (0.131) (0.123) (0.067)
Atleast one neighbor invests -0.0937 -0.0666 -0.0599 -0.132 -0.131* -0.0625 -0.0871*
(0.065) (0.108) (0.073) (0.082) (0.080) (0.063) (0.051)
Atleast one neighbor invests x Global -0.463*** -0.603*** -0.608*** -0.379*** -0.213 -0.324*** -0.191***
(0.102) (0.144) (0.107) (0.096) (0.146) (0.109) (0.073)
Atleast one neighbor invests x Local -0.470*** -0.688*** -0.625*** -0.315*** -0.333** -0.426*** -0.357***
(0.091) (0.124) (0.093) (0.106) (0.166) (0.110) (0.071)
Invest lag -0.253*** -0.0672 -0.151*** -0.237*** -0.175*** -0.324*** -0.190***
(0.039) (0.049) (0.055) (0.034) (0.066) (0.060) (0.030)
Round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 696 348 696 696 348 696 1740
Robust standard errors in parentheses; p∗ < 0.10, p∗∗ < 0.05, p∗∗∗ < 0.010
Across the two communication structures, there are differences in the information avail-
able to the subjects. In the global architecture, subjects can incorporate the decisions
of everyone in the group, whereas in the local structure, information is readily available
about their direct neighbors but not of member further away. To identify what informa-
tion applies to subjects, I estimate a random effect GLS model. I perform separate estima-
tions for each position in the network and across all treatment. The model specification:
investIit =
4∑
k=1
βkinvest
k
jt + ηXi + εit for i 6= j (11)
Where investIit is the investment decision of subject i in position I in period t. investKjt
represents the investment decision of subject j in position K61 in period t. Xi includes
control for round , session fixed effect, and demographic variables – gender and race. Table
17 and 1862 report results from Baseline , and the two communication structures.
61K 6= I
62I conduct am analysis using the 1/round as a dependent variable and find the similar results (please
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Table 17: Baseline – Effect of Other’s Decision on Your Decision
Line Asymmetric Circle
A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
Invest A -0.126*** -0.0499 -0.0404 0.0386 -0.0692** -0.215*** 0.0767** -0.133*** 0.00650 0.203*** 0.103** -0.161***
(0.021) (0.047) (0.047) (0.033) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.050) (0.049) (0.071) (0.043) (0.028)
Invest B -0.133*** 0.121*** 0.0390 -0.0538 -0.0938** -0.0819 0.0253 0.109*** 0.00381 0.151*** -0.0568** 0.142***
(0.025) (0.040) (0.047) (0.046) (0.041) (0.050) (0.037) (0.037) (0.029) (0.043) (0.028) (0.040)
Invest C -0.0583 0.136*** -0.222*** 0.174*** -0.269*** -0.0718 0.140*** 0.156*** 0.120*** 0.151*** 0.0304 -0.0576
(0.055) (0.045) (0.037) (0.046) (0.047) (0.044) (0.036) (0.050) (0.045) (0.042) (0.036) (0.051)
Invest D -0.0417 0.0415 -0.209*** -0.0769 0.0904** 0.0101 0.130*** -0.129** 0.0665** -0.0626** 0.0334 -0.0371
(0.049) (0.047) (0.033) (0.049) (0.045) (0.031) (0.037) (0.061) (0.028) (0.031) (0.039) (0.054)
Invest E 0.0369 -0.0483 0.142*** -0.0600 -0.122** 0.0779*** 0.116*** -0.104** -0.115*** 0.174*** -0.0702 -0.0412
(0.031) (0.042) (0.038) (0.044) (0.048) (0.026) (0.039) (0.050) (0.018) (0.053) (0.064) (0.058)
Round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Baseline
In the Line network, the actions of the subjects on the periphery, A and E, have an
inverse relation with their neighbors. Unlike subject at position D whose actions are con-
sistent with a best reply to both her neighbors, subjects at positions B and C give a best
reply to only one of their two neighbors. There is a positive relationship between the ac-
tions of subjects B and C, which leads to overprovision.
Without communication subjects in the periphery (A and E) in Asymmetric network,
take actions consistent with the best reply function. Subjects in positions B and D repli-
cate this pattern in the actions with their neighbors in the periphery. However, the ac-
tions of subjects B, C, and D between them contradict the best response, which leads to
overprovision. In the absence of communication, subjects across all positions end up mis-
coordinating their actions with at least one of their neighbors in the Circle network.
see Appendix B.2.1 ).
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Table 18: Communication – Effect of Other’s Decision on Your Decision
Line Asymmetric Circle
A B C D E A B C D E A B C D E
Global Communication
Invest A -0.479*** 0.255*** -0.280*** 0.105*** -0.615*** -0.0476 0.134*** 0.127*** -0.366*** -0.0000278 -0.00856 -0.0988**
(0.071) (0.035) (0.033) (0.037) (0.030) (0.058) (0.041) (0.046) (0.048) (0.056) (0.051) (0.042)
Invest B -0.476*** -0.374*** 0.131*** -0.0912*** -0.647*** -0.271*** 0.0562 0.0223 -0.382*** -0.270*** 0.0488 0.0719
(0.085) (0.054) (0.045) (0.034) (0.030) (0.046) (0.037) (0.036) (0.056) (0.050) (0.042) (0.047)
Invest C 0.204*** -0.301*** -0.0836* 0.191*** -0.0367 -0.198*** -0.0742* 0.101*** -0.0000272 -0.254*** -0.0986* 0.154***
(0.040) (0.043) (0.045) (0.034) (0.045) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.055) (0.043) (0.051) (0.047)
Invest D -0.212*** 0.0999** -0.0794* -0.451*** 0.152*** 0.0607 -0.109* -0.669*** -0.00748 0.0409 -0.0880** -0.129***
(0.039) (0.046) (0.042) (0.052) (0.049) (0.039) (0.064) (0.032) (0.045) (0.034) (0.043) (0.036)
Invest E 0.0674** -0.0590** 0.154*** -0.382*** 0.148*** 0.0247 0.154*** -0.688*** -0.0861** 0.0601 0.137*** -0.129***
(0.027) (0.029) (0.041) (0.044) (0.050) (0.040) (0.054) (0.027) (0.035) (0.040) (0.038) (0.035)
Local Communication
Invest A -0.616*** 0.238*** -0.0770 0.167*** -0.468*** -0.126** -0.125*** -0.0108 -0.293*** -0.0273 0.0865** -0.324***
(0.086) (0.071) (0.058) (0.058) (0.040) (0.053) (0.025) (0.033) (0.042) (0.052) (0.041) (0.037)
Invest B -0.619*** -0.276*** 0.205*** 0.226*** -0.646*** -0.475*** -0.316*** -0.0321 -0.298*** -0.408*** 0.0700* 0.148***
(0.062) (0.057) (0.074) (0.058) (0.034) (0.054) (0.049) (0.054) (0.051) (0.043) (0.039) (0.037)
Invest C 0.190*** -0.218*** -0.298*** 0.109** -0.132** -0.360*** -0.308*** 0.000367 -0.0286 -0.420*** -0.250*** 0.143***
(0.043) (0.069) (0.058) (0.053) (0.054) (0.046) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054) (0.033) (0.054) (0.035)
Invest D -0.0597 0.158** -0.303*** -0.572*** -0.141*** -0.257*** -0.331*** -0.538*** 0.0743** 0.0590* -0.205*** -0.214***
(0.043) (0.064) (0.039) (0.052) (0.023) (0.043) (0.050) (0.064) (0.036) (0.034) (0.044) (0.049)
Invest E 0.0891** 0.120*** 0.0663* -0.394*** -0.0108 -0.0234 0.000352 -0.481*** -0.301*** 0.134*** 0.125*** -0.228***
(0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.051) (0.033) (0.039) (0.050) (0.056) (0.032) (0.033) (0.034) (0.049)
Round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Communication Architectures
In both communication architectures in the Line network, subjects across all positions
coordinate their action with all group members. As predicted by the best reply function,
subjects’ action is negatively related to their direct neighbors. There is a positive relation-
ship between the actions of unconnected group members, as predicted by the Nash equilib-
rium profile. Across all positions, subjects take into account the choices of all group mem-
bers in their decision-making process in global structure in Asymmetric network, whereas
in the local architecture subjects give weight to the action of subjects directly connected
to them and their neighbors. I find a positive relationship between the actions of B and D,
corroborating the coordination on the behavioral equilibrium (A4). In the Circle network
subjects are successful in giving best replies to their neighbors and but fail to coordinate
with subjects unconnected to them in the global structure, which explains the lower rates
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of corresponds to the observation that groups were less likely to coordinate on an equilib-
rium vis-à-vis Line and the Asymmetric network. With the local structure, subjects are
not only successful in giving best replies to their neighbors but also coordinate with sub-
jects in their maximal independent set.
Result 8. Without communication there are frequent mis-coordinations in action; com-
munication architecture leads to better coordination both with direct and indirect neighbors
across all network structures.
Effect of number of neighbors on investment decision
The literature studying the effect of network structure on public goods provision finds
a negative relationship between the number of neighbors and their probability of investing.
To test this hypothesis, I estimate a logistic panel model with the number of neighbors
as the main variable of interest. I perform separate estimations for three treatments. The
model for each treatment is:
investit =
3∑
k=1
βkdegree
K
i + ζX + εit (12)
where investit is the investment decision of subject i in period t. degreeK shows the num-
ber of neighbors subject i has, degree1 indicates one neighbor, degree2 indicates two neigh-
bors, and degree3 indicates three neighbors. Xi includes control for number of neighbors
who invested in the current period and last period, last period decision, round , session
fixed effect, and demographic variables – gender and race.
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Table 19: Number of Neighbors and Investments
Baseline Global Local
Line Asymmetric Line Asymmetric Line Asymmetric
One neighbor (mean) 0.364 0.515 0.449 0.429 0.409 0.371
(0.040) (0.044) (0.021) (0.034) (0.025) (0.032)
Two neighbors -0.00344 -0.0362 0.0497 -0.122* 0.0533 -0.0294
(0.059) (0.102) (0.038) (0.063) (0.034) (0.052)
Three neighbors -0.254*** 0.147*** 0.189***
(0.070) (0.050) (0.058)
# Neighbor invests -0.0442 -0.0104 -0.234*** -0.227*** -0.257*** -0.281***
(0.034) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.020) (0.028)
Invest lag -0.180*** -0.190*** -0.258*** -0.398*** -0.295*** -0.316***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.067) (0.052) (0.054) (0.054)
Round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 540 540 540 540 540 540
Robust standard errors in parentheses; p∗ < 0.10, p∗∗ < 0.05, p∗∗∗ < 0.010
The effect of the number of neighbors on the likelihood of investing is more pronounced
in the Asymmetric network. In the baseline, compared to subjects with one neighbor, sub-
jects with three neighbors are 49% less likely to invest. This effect is reversed in the global
and local communication architectures. In fact, in the global architecture subjects with
three neighbors are 34% more likely to invest and with local communication subjects with
three neighbors 50% more likely to invest than subjects with one neighbor (see Table 1963.
In the Line, the pattern of alternating investments between subjects with one and two
neighbors leads to no statistically significant differences between the likelihood of invest-
ing. Introducing the two communication structures, subjects pay attention to the actions
of neighbors, which is reflected by a negative relationship between a subject’s and their
neighbors’ investment decisions. A negative estimate between current and last round’s de-
cision is consistent with play alternating among Nash equilibria.
63I conduct a similar analysis using the 1/round as a dependent variable and find the similar results
(please see Appendix B.2.1 )
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Result 9. Both the communication architectures nudge subjects with more neighbors to
invest.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study the effect of communication in a repeated best shot public
goods game across three network structures. The research question I set out to study is
the efficacy of communication as a coordination device. I explore the effect of two com-
munication architectures: global and local. Compared to the baseline, communication
is successful in raising efficiency across the three network structures. Groups in Line and
Asymmetric networks consistently alternate between equilibrium profiles where two and
three group members are investing. This pattern of investment suggests that groups pre-
fer both efficiency and equity. Groups in Circle network with the global communication
were less successful in negotiating on strategies they could coordinate across the rounds.
This highlights the difficulties of having a larger Nash set, which leads to mis-coordination.
Local communication constrained by the externalities network performs better across all
network structures.
These findings have implications for policy interventions that involve situations where
actions are locally substitutable and exhibit externalities. These decisions could range
from an investment decision in a technology by farmers64 to doctors adopting a new prac-
tice protocols65. Communication can be used as a device to resolve inefficiencies in the
provision of the local public goods. Depending on the underlying network structure, the
global or local structure can be implemented. Local communication is more natural to im-
plement in a network setting where individuals are more likely to communicate with their
neighbors.
64There is a large body of literature highlighting the importance of social interaction in technology
adoption and diffusion (Chuang and Schechter, 2015, Foster and Rosenzweig, 2010, Conley and Udry,
2010).
65Tasselli (2014) provides an excellent overview of the literature studying the effect of social networks
on physician’s decisions.
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4 Conclusion
The two chapters in this dissertation present evidence that both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary mechanisms can be effective in resolving the inefficiency of the provision of local
public goods. In the absence of these mechanisms, there is underinvestment in the pub-
lic goods, the individuals in the periphery are severely affected by lack of access to the
public good. Both cost sharing and communication help increase access to public goods.
However, there is heterogeneity in the effect of each mechanism across the three network
structures. Policymakers should be cognizant of the underlying network structure when
implementing policies.
The first chapter finds that a tax-subsidy regime based on the number of neighbors is
successful in raising efficiency across both homogenous and heterogeneous networks. Al-
though global cost sharing has nice normative properties, it is unsuccessful in raising effi-
ciency in non-symmetric networks. The uniform payoff generated by the global cost shar-
ing rule for all individuals in the network does not incentivize central individuals to invest
in the public good. It is crucial to identify the properties of the network when designing
policies..
The second chapter finds that both global communication and communication con-
strained by the underlying externalities network are successful in raising efficiency and
equity across all network structures. Although the efficiency is comparable between the
global and local structure in the Line and Asymmetric network, the difference in the prop-
erties of the two structure leads to differences in patterns of equilibrium selection. Local
communication is effective even when the set of Nash equilibrium profiles is large and it
might be more difficult for individuals to negotiate on a set of strategies.
Based on the two chapters and the empirical evidence pointing at the efficacy of en-
dogenously occurring social norms in sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas (Ostrom,
2014). In future research, allowing groups to communicate and decide on a cost-sharing
agreement can help in raising the overall efficiency of provision of local public goods. The
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results from the study allow an empirical test of the cooperative game theory solutions
proposed in Myerson (1977) and Jackson (2005). Data are informative about the effect of
network structure and individual position on the sharing rules agreed upon.
Experimental methods allow for a clear identification of the network structure on in-
dividual and group decision making. The social, economic, and infrastructure networks
outside the laboratory are large. However, a major limitation of my studying network
in the laboratory is that the size of the network is restricted by the seats available in the
lab. The results from the three stylized network present evidence in favor of the efficacy
of cost sharing and communication. However, generalizing these results for policy requires
testing of these mechanisms over larger networks in an online experiment or field settings.
There is evidence of biases in individuals recalling information about network structure,
which bears out both in a controlled laboratory experiment and in two friendship networks
from a Silicon Valley firm (Dessi et al., 2016). These biases might affect the efficacy of the
mechanism presented in this dissertation.
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A Appendix Chapter 1
A.1 Instructions - Cost Sharing
Welcome!
No Talking Allowed
Once the experiment begins, we request that you do not to talk until the end of the exper-
iment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
Three Stages
There are 3 stages in this experiment. Each stage consists of 10 rounds. So, there are a
total of 30 rounds in this experiment. At the beginning of each stage, you will be:
1. Randomly matched with four other individuals in the room. Group composition re-
mains fixed within each stage but differs across stages.
2. At the end of each round, you will be provided a summary of your earnings in the
experiment.
Payment
You will earn in cents for the decisions you make in each round of the experiment. At
the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash your total earnings from all the 30
rounds.
Decision Environment
Members of each group are randomly assigned to one of the five positions, {A, B, C,
D or E}, as shown, in Figure 1, below at the beginning of each stage. Assigned positions
remains fixed within each stage but differs across stages.
Your assigned position determines which members of the group you are connected to. A
connection between two positions is represented by a line. For example, in Figure 1, if
your position is at C, then you are connected to two of your group members, the ones as-
signed to positions B and D. We will call B and D your neighbors and {B, C, D} your
neighborhood.
Decision Task and Payoffs
Stage 1:
There is a neighborhood common fund that you share with your neighbors. At the be-
ginning of each round, everyone is asked to make a decision on whether to INVEST in the
neighborhood common fund at a cost of 75 cents. If there is at least one investment in the
neighborhood common fund then the individual who invested, as well as each of his neigh-
bors, earns 100 cents.
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Line
1. You earn 25 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund) minus 75 cents
(the cost of investing).
2. Your neighbor at D earns 100 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund
as you and B invested).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 25 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund) mi-
nus 75 cents (the cost of investing)
Figure 13: Stage 1 - Instruction - Line
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
Asymmetric
1. You earn 25 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund) minus 75 cents
(the cost of investing).
2. Your neighbor at D earns 100 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund
as you and B invested).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 25 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund) mi-
nus 75 cents (the cost of investing)
Figure 14: Stage 1 - Instruction - Asymmetric
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
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Circle
1. You earn 25 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund) minus 75 cents
(the cost of investing).
2. Your neighbor at D earns 100 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund
as you and B invested).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 25 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund) mi-
nus 75 cents (the cost of investing)
Figure 15: Stage 1 - Instruction - Circle
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
Stage 2:
Transfers are introduced in stage 2: Individuals who invest receive a transfer of 25
cents from each neighbor who does not invest. Decision tasks are the same as in Stage 1.
Example: Suppose your position is C. If C (you), and B invest but A, D, and E do not
invest, then both you and B receive a transfer of 25 cents from D, in addition B receives a
transfer of 25 cents from A. Payoffs (Figure 2) are:
Line
1. You earn 50 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund), minus 75 cents (the
cost of investing) plus 25 cents (25 cents transfer from D your neighbor who did not
invest).
2. Your neighbor at D earns 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund
as you invested) minus 25 cents (D’s transfer to you).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 50 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund),
minus 75 cents (the cost of investing) plus 25 cents (25 cents transfer from A, B’s
neighbors who did not invest).
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Figure 16: Local Cost Sharing - Instruction - Line
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
INVEST
(50 cents)
INVEST
(50 cents)
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
Asymmetric
1. You earn 50 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund), minus 75 cents (the
cost of investing) plus 25 cents (25 cents transfer from D your neighbor who did not
invest).
2. Your neighbor at D earns 50 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund
as you invested) minus 50 cents (D’s transfers to you and B).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 75 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund),
minus 75 cents (the cost of investing) plus 50 cents (25 cents transfers from A and D,
B’s neighbors who did not invest).
Figure 17: Local Cost Sharing - Instruction - Asymmetric
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
INVEST
(75 cents)
INVEST
(50 cents)
NOT INVEST
(50 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
Circle
1. You earn 50 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund), minus 75 cents (the
cost of investing) plus 25 cents (25 cents transfers from D your neighbor who did not
invest).
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2. Your neighbor at D earns 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund
as you invested) minus 25 cents (D’s transfer to you).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 50 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund),
minus 75 cents (the cost of investing) plus 25 cents (25 cents transfers from A, B’s
neighbors who did not invest).
Figure 18: Local Cost Sharing - Instruction - Circle
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
INVEST
(50 cents)
INVEST
(50 cents)
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
Stage 3:
Cost sharing is introduced in stage 3: The total cost of investments for the group is
equally shared by individuals who benefit from the common fund. Decision tasks are the
same as in Stage 1.
Example: Suppose your position is C. Suppose C (you) invest but A, B, D, and E do not
invest. Then the total cost of investment is 75 cents. C (you), B and D benefit from the
common fund and each pay 25 cents (= 75/3). Then payoffs (Figure 3) are:
Line
1. You earn 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund) minus 25 cents
(the cost of investing).
2. Your neighbor at D earns 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund)
minus 25 cents (the cost of investing).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund)
minus 25 cents (the cost of investing).
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Figure 19: Global Cost Sharing - Instruction - Line
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
INVEST
(75 cents)
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
Asymmetric
1. You earn 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund) minus 25 cents
(the cost of investing).
2. Your neighbor at D earns 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund)
minus 25 cents (the cost of investing).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund)
minus 25 cents (the cost of investing).
Figure 20: Global Cost Sharing - Instruction - Asymmetric
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
INVEST
(75 cents)
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
Circle
1. You earn 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund) minus 25 cents
(the cost of investing).
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2. Your neighbor at D earns 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund)
minus 25 cents (the cost of investing).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 75 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund)
minus 25 cents (the cost of investing).
Figure 21: Global Cost Sharing - Instruction - Circle
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
INVEST
(75 cents)
NOT INVEST
(75 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
A.2 Extra Tables
Table 20: OLS Estimates - Efficiency Across Treatments (1/Rounds)
Line Asymmetric Circle
Local 0.104*** 0.0625* 0.0982***
(0.024) (0.033) (0.032)
Global 0.101*** 0.00748 0.0813***
(0.025) (0.037) (0.031)
1/Round -0.115*** -0.0859*** -0.106***
(0.038) (0.026) (0.040)
Observations 480 480 480
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 21: OLS Estimates - Efficiency Across Network (1/Rounds)
Baseline Local Global
Asymmetric 0.0585** 0.0165 -0.0349
(0.028) (0.034) (0.030)
Circle 0.0812*** 0.0750** 0.0616**
(0.030) (0.032) (0.030)
1/Round 0.00401 -0.169*** -0.141***
(0.040) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 480 480 480
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 22: Access to Public Good and Excess Provision (1/Rounds)
Access to Public Good Excess Provision
Line Asymmetric Circle Line Asymmetric Circle
Local 0.154*** 0.175*** 0.196*** 0.0963** 0.271*** 0.163***
(0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041)
Global 0.192*** 0.151*** 0.182*** 0.150*** 0.224*** 0.174***
(0.022) (0.030) (0.030) (0.055) (0.032) (0.049)
1/Round 0.00614 0.0210 -0.00322 0.193*** 0.156*** 0.195***
(0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.030) (0.043) (0.047)
Observations 480 480 480 480 480 480
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 23: Marginal Effect of Probability of Coordinating on Equilibrium (1/Rounds)
Line Asymmetric Circle
Baseline (mean) 0.131*** 0.150*** 0.181***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.036)
Local 0.0875** -0.0125 0.119**
(0.042) (0.039) (0.046)
Global 0.156*** 0 0.0500
(0.045) (0.040) (0.044)
1/Round -0.156* -0.202** -0.253***
(0.080) (0.086) (0.089)
Observations 480 480 480
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.010
Table 24: Marginal Effect of Neighbors on Investment (1/Rounds)
Baseline Local Global
One neighbor 0.500 0.385 0.679
(0.039) (0.050) (0.041)
Two neighbors -0.118* 0.210** -0.0941
(0.072) (0.094) (0.072)
Three neighbors -0.222*** 0.279*** -0.208***
(0.054) (0.077) (0.077)
# neighbors invest lag 0.0157 -0.0303 -0.0465*
(0.031) (0.037) (0.027)
Invest lag -0.116*** -0.0659 -0.0660
(0.041) (0.045) (0.043)
1/Round Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes
Observations 720 720 720
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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A.3 Proof – Proposition
Lemma 1. In the baseline game without cost sharing rules, in the Line network, the pure
strategy Nash equilibria are (1,0,1,0,1), (0,1,0,1,0), (1,0,0,1,0), and (0,1,0,0,1). In the
Asymmetric network, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are (1,0,1,0,1), (1,0,0,1,0), and
(0,1,0,0,1). In the Circle network, the pure strategy Nash equilibria are (1,0,0,1,0), (1,0,1,0,0),
(0,1,0,0,1), (0,0,1,0,1) and (0,1,0,1,0)
Proof. In a Nash equilibrium, we show that:
1. ai = 1 if and only if ∀j ∈ Ni, aj = 0
2. ai = 0 if and only if ∃j ∈ Ni s.t. aj = 1
Let’s consider the first condition, consider a profile of actions, aj such that, ∀j ∈ Ni, aj =
0. Then the best reply for agent i is ai = 1 because ui(0,aj , G) = 0 and ui(1,aj , G) =
b − c, ui(1,aj , G) > ui(0,aj , G) since b > c > 0. Consider a profile of actions , aj such
that, ∃j ∈ Ni s.t. aj = 1, then the best reply of agent i is ai = 0 because ui(0,aj , G) = b
and ui(1,aj , G) = b − c and ui(0,aj , G) > ui(1,aj , G) since b > b − c. Assume a Nash
equilibrium ai = 0 and ∀j ∈ Ni, aj = 0, then the best reply for agent i is ai = 1 because
ui(0,aj , G) = 0 and ui(1,aj , G) = b−c, a contradiction. Assume a Nash equilibrium ai = 1
and ∃j ∈ Ni s.t. aj = 1, then the best reply for agent i is ai = 0 because ui(0,aj , G) = b
and ui(1,aj , G) = b − c, a contradiction. Based on the best reply it is straightforward to
verify that the pure strategy Nash equilibria listed are the set of all possible Nash equilib-
ria 
Proposition 4. Suppose η ≤ 1
maxG{Nk} :
1. If it is optimal for an agent to invest in the baseline, then it is optimal for the agent
to invest in the game with local cost sharing.
2. If it is optimal for an agent to not invest in the baseline, then it is optimal for the
agent to not invest in the game with local cost sharing.
3. Inefficient equilibrium in the Line and Asymmetric network is Pareto dominated by
an efficient equilibrium.
Proof. The following are the proofs for the three claims in Proposition 1.
Part 1: From Lemma 1 we know that in the baseline game without cost sharing, ai = 1
if and only if ∀j ∈ Ni, aj = 0. The best reply is the same in the game with local
cost sharing. In the game with local cost sharing rule, consider a profile of action,
aj such that, ∀j ∈ Ni, aj = 0. Then the best reply for player i is ai = 1 because
ui(0,aj , G) = 0 and ui(1,aj , G) = b − c + Niηc, ui(1,aj , G) > ui(0,aj , G) since
b− c > 0 and Niηc > 0.
Part 2: From Lemma 1 we know that in the baseline game without cost sharing, ai = 0 if
and only if ∃j ∈ Ni s.t. aj = 1. In the game with local cost sharing rule, consider the
following two cases:
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Case 1: For η < 1
maxG{Nk} the best reply in the game with local cost sharing is the
same as in the baseline. Assume a Nash equilibrium where, r agents in agent
i’s neighborhood are investing, then the best reply of agent i is ai = 0 because
ui(0,aj , G) = b − rηc and ui(1,aj , G) = b − c + (Ni − r)ηc, ui(0,aj , G) >
ui(1,aj , G) since η < 1maxG{Nk} .
Case 2: For η = 1
maxG{Nk} , if it is optimal for an agent to not invest in the baseline,
it is optimal for the agent to not invest in the game with local cost sharing. In
the baseline, agent i best reply is ai = 0 if and only if ∃j ∈ Ni s.t. aj = 1.
Assume a Nash equilibrium, r agents in agent i’s neighborhood are investing,
then the best reply of agent i is ai = 0 because ui(0,aj , G) = b − rηc and
ui(1,aj , G) = b−c+(Ni−r)ηc, ui(0,aj , G) < ui(1,aj , G) if Ni < maxGNiNk and
ui(0,aj , G) = ui(1,aj , G) for Ni = Nk. Therefore, agents with the maximum
number of neighbors will be indifferent between investing or not investing when
there are r investments in their neighborhood. Therefore if it was optimal for
an agent to not invest in the baseline, it still will be weakly optimal for them to
invest in the game with local cost sharing rule.
Applying Parts 1 and 2 it can be verified that pure strategy Nash equilibrium that
in the Line network are: (1,0,1,0,1), (0,1,0,1,0), (1,0,0,1,0), and (0,1,0,1,0). In the
Asymmetric network, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are (1,0,1,0,1), (1,0,0,1,0),
and (0,1,0,0,1). In the Circle network, the pure strategy Nash equilibria are (1,0,0,1,0),
(1,0,1,0,0), (0,1,0,0,1), (0,0,1,0,1) and (0,1,0,1,0).
Part 3: For Line maxG{Nk} = 2 and Asymmetric maxG{Nk} = 3 , so for η66 used in the
experiment satisfies η ≤ 1
maxG{Ni} . Table 25 reports the pure strategy Nash equilibria
in Line and Asymmetric networks and the corresponding payoffs.
Table 25: Equilibrium Profits
Investment Decision Theoretical Profits
A B C D E A B C D E
Line
(L1) 1 0 1 0 1 b− (1− η)c b− 2ηc b− (1− 2η)c b− 2ηc b− (1− η)c
(L2) 0 1 0 1 0 b− ηc b− (1− 2η)c b− ηc b− (1− 2η)c b− ηc
(L3) 0 1 0 0 1 b− ηc b− (1− 2η)c b− ηc b− ηc b− (1− η)c
(L4) 1 0 0 1 0 b− (1− η)c b− ηc b− ηc b− (1− 2η)c b− ηc
Asymmetric
(A1) 1 0 1 0 1 b− (1− η)c b− 2ηc b− (1− 2η)c b− 2ηc b− (1− η)c
(A2) 0 1 0 0 1 b− ηc b− (1− 3η)c b− ηc b− 2ηc b− (1− η)c
(A3) 1 0 0 1 0 b− (1− η)c b− 2ηc b− ηc b− (1− 3η)c b− ηc
(A4) 0 1 0 1 0 b− ηc b− (1− 2η)c b− ηc b− (1− 2η)c b− ηc
In the Line network, the payoff of each agent in pure strategy Nash equilibria: L3
and L4 either remains the same or increases in comparison to L1 (inefficient equilib-
rium). Similarly in the Asymmetric network, the payoff for each agent in pure strat-
egy Nash equilibria: A2 and A3 either remains the same or increases in comparison
to A1 (inefficient equilibrium,).
66η = 13
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Proposition 5. In the game with the global cost sharing rule and a given strategy profile
for aj such that everyone in the network has access to the public good then :
1. If it is optimal for agent i to invest in the baseline, then it is optimal for agent i to
invest in the game with global cost sharing rule.
2. If it is optimal for agent i to not invest in the baseline, then it is optimal for agent i
to not invest in the game with global cost sharing in the Line, Asymmetric and Circle
networks.
3. Inefficient equilibrium is Pareto dominated by the efficient equilibrium.
Proof. The following are the proofs for the three claims in Proposition 2.
Part 1 If agent i invest in the baseline then no one in her neighborhood is investing (see
Lemma 1). If so then her decision with global cost shairng remains optimal because
of investing with global cost sharing is less than or equal to the cost of investing, c,
in the baseline.
Part 2 If agent i does not invest in the baseline then it must be the case that is there is
at least one of her neighbors investing (see Lemma 1). If agent i invests then the
benefit remains the same but the total cost of provision increases since there is an
additional investment which generates no new benefits.
Part 3 Consider an inefficient equilibrium profile, α, where there are c0 investments in the
network,and an efficient equilibrium profile, β, where there are c1 investments in the
network. The payoff of agent i is:
ui(α) = b− c× c0
N
ui(β) = b− c× c1
N
Since c0 > c1 it implies that
ui(β) > ui(α)

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Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium
The decision whether to invest or not depends on the evaluation of the following condi-
tion:
b− c ≥
(
1−
Ni∏
i=1
(1− pi)
)
b(
Ni∏
i=1
(1− pi)
)
≥ c
b
Where pi be the probability of investing for agent i in a network.
Line Network
To solve for the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium we look for values of pi for i ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}
such that the following conditions are satisfied implying that each player is indifferent be-
tween investing and not investing.
Player A : (1− pB) = c
b
(13)
Player B : (1− pA)(1− pC) = c
b
(14)
Player C : (1− pB)(1− pD) = c
b
(15)
Player D : (1− pC)(1− pE) = c
b
(16)
Player E : (1− pD) = c
b
(17)
Case 1: We start with pB = 1− cb (see condition in equation 14). Substituting pB = 1− cb
in equation 15 we derive that pD = 0, which implies pE = 1. To solve for pA and pC
the condition in equation 14 simplifies to:
(1− pA)(1− pC) = c
b
=⇒ pA = 1− c
b(1− pC)
There are many values of pC ∈ (0, 1 − cb ] as long pA ∈ (0, 1 − cb ]. So a mixed
strategy Nash equilibria:
(
pA, 1− cb , 1− cb(1−pA) , 0, 1
)
and by symmetry we have
1,
(
1, 0, 1− c
b(1−pE) , 0.5, pE
)
. For pA = 1 − cb , equation 14 implies that pC = 0.
Hence (1 − c
b
, 1 − c
b
, 0, 1 − c
b
, 1 − c
b
), (1 − c
b
, 1 − c
b
, 0, 1, 0), and (1 − c
b
, 1 − c
b
, 0, 0, 1)
are Nash equilibria. By symmetry, (0, 1, 0, 1 − c
b
, v) and (1, 0, 0, 1 − c
b
, 1 − c
b
) are also
Nash equilibria.
Case2: For pB = 1− cb and lets assume pA = 0 , we know from equation 15, pD = 0 which
implies pE = 1. From equation 14 we know pC = 1− cb . Hence, (0, 1− cb , 1− cb , 0, 1) is
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a Nash equilibrium. By symmetry, (1, 0, 1− c
b
, 1− c
b
0)is also an equilibrium.
Asymmetric Network
To solve for the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium we look for values of pi for i ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}
such that the following conditions are satisfied implying that each player is indifferent be-
tween investing and not investing.
Player A : (1− pB) = c
b
(18)
Player B : (1− pA)(1− pC)(1− pD) = c
b
(19)
Player C : (1− pB)(1− pD) = c
b
(20)
Player D : (1− pB)(1− pC)(1− pE) = c
b
(21)
Player E : (1− pD) = c
b
(22)
Case 1: We start with pB = 1− cb (see condition in equation 18). Substituting pB = 1− cb
in equation 20 we derive that pD = 0, which implies pE = 1. To solve for pA and pC
the condition in equation 19 simplifies to:
(1− pA)(1− pC) = c
b
=⇒ pC = 1− c
b(1− pA)
There are many values of pC ∈ (0, 1 − cb ] as long pA ∈ (0, 1 − cb . The following are
the mixed strategy Nash equilibria:
(
pA, 1− cb , 1− cb(1−pA) , 0, 1
)
and by symmetry we
have
(
1, 0, 1− c
b(1−pE) , 1− cb , pE
)
.
Case 2: For pB = 1 − cb we know from equation 20, pD = 0 which implies pE = 1. Lets
assume pA = 0, according to equation 19, pC = 1− cb . We have a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium (0, 1− c
b
, 1− c
b
, 0.1). By symmetry we have (1, 0, 1− c
b
, 1− c
b
, 0) as a mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium. Assume, pB = pD = 1 − cb , based equation 20 we have
pC = 0, (0, 1− cb , 0, 1− cb , 0) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Circle Network
To solve for the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium we look for values of pi for i ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}
such that the following conditions are satisfied implying that each player is indifferent be-
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tween investing and not investing.
Player A : (1− pE)(1− pB) = c
b
(23)
Player B : (1− pA)(1− pC) = c
b
(24)
Player C : (1− pB)(1− pD) = c
b
(25)
Player D : (1− pC)(1− pE) = c
b
(26)
Player E : (1− pA)(1− pD) = c
b
(27)
Case 1: Symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, lets assume pi = p ∀i ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}
in that case any of the equation 23 - 27 simplifies to
(1− p)2 = c
b
p = 1−
√
c
b
Symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium,
(
1−√ c
b
, 1−√ c
b
, 1−√ c
b
, 1−√ c
b
, 1−√ c
b
)
Case 2: Lets assume pC = pE = 0, equation 26 would imply pD = 1, solving equation23
we get pB = 1 − cb and solving equation 24 we get pA = 1 − cb , therefore (1 − cb , 1 −
c
b
, 0, 1, 0). Similarly (0, 1, 0, 1 − c
b
, 1 − c
b
), (0, 1 − c
b
, 1 − c
b
, 0, 1), (1 − c
b
, 0, 1, 0, 1 − c
b
),
(1, 0, 1− c
b
, 1− c
b
, 0) are mixed strategy Nash equilibria.
B Appendix Chapter 2
B.1 Instructions - Communication
Welcome!
No Talking Allowed
Once the experiment begins, we request that you do not to talk until the end of the exper-
iment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
Three Stages
There are 3 stages in this experiment. Each stage consists of 10 rounds. So, there are a
total of 30 rounds in this experiment. At the beginning of each stage, you will be:
1. Randomly matched with four other individuals in the room. Group composition re-
mains fixed within each stage but differs across stages.
2. At the end of each round, you will be provided a summary of your earnings in the
experiment.
73
Payment
You will earn in cents for the decisions you make in each round of the experiment. At
the end of the experiment, you will be paid in cash your total earnings from all the 30
rounds.
Decision Environment
Members of each group are randomly assigned to one of the five positions, {A, B, C,
D or E}, as shown, in Figure 1, below at the beginning of each stage. Assigned positions
remains fixed within each stage but differs across stages.
Your assigned position determines which members of the group you are connected to. A
connection between two positions is represented by a line. For example, in Figure 1, if
your position is at C, then you are connected to two of your group members, the ones as-
signed to positions B and D. We will call B and D your neighbors and {B, C, D} your
neighborhood.
Decision Task and Payoffs
Stage 1:
There is a neighborhood common fund that you share with your neighbors. At the be-
ginning of each round, everyone is asked to make a decision on whether to INVEST in the
neighborhood common fund at a cost of 75 cents. If there is at least one investment in the
neighborhood common fund then the individual who invested, as well as each of his neigh-
bors, earns 100 cents.
Line
1. You earn 25 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund) minus 75 cents
(the cost of investing).
2. Your neighbor at D earns 100 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund
as you and B invested).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 25 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund) mi-
nus 75 cents (the cost of investing)
Figure 22: Stage 1 - Instruction - Line
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
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Asymmetric
1. You earn 25 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund) minus 75 cents
(the cost of investing).
2. Your neighbor at D earns 100 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund
as you and B invested).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 25 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund) mi-
nus 75 cents (the cost of investing)
Figure 23: Stage 1 - Instruction - Asymmetric
D
C
EA
B
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
NOT INVEST
(0 cents)
Circle
1. You earn 25 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund) minus 75 cents
(the cost of investing).
2. Your neighbor at D earns 100 cents: 100 cents (from the neighborhood common fund
as you and B invested).
3. Your neighbor at B earns 25 cents: 100 cents (from neighborhood common fund) mi-
nus 75 cents (the cost of investing)
Figure 24: Stage 1 - Instruction - Circle
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EA
B
NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
INVEST
(25 cents)
INVEST
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NOT INVEST
(100 cents)
NOT INVEST
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Stage 2:
In stage 2, at the beginning of each round, the group can communicate via a group
chat window for 1 minute. The decision task is the same as in Stage 1.
Please focus your communication on the following two points:
1. Your investment decision, and
2. Who in the group should invest.
Stage 3:
In stage 3, at the beginning of each round, you and your neighbors can communicate
via a chat window for 1 minute. The decision task is the same as in Stage 1.
Please focus your communication on the following two points:
1. Your investment decision, and
2. Who in the neighborhood should invest.
B.2 Supplemental Regression, Tables and Figures
• In order to estimate effect of the two communication architectures on the likelihood
of coordinating on a equilibrium. For each of the network structure, I estimate the
following panel logistic regression model with random effects at the group level.
Equilibriumit =
3∑
k=1
βkC
k + κRound+ εit (28)
Where Equilibriumit is an indicator function which takes the value 1 if the groups
coordinate on any equilibrium profile for group i in period t„ CK indicates the com-
munication treatment variable, where C1 is the no communication treatment, C2 is
the global architecture, and C3 is the local architecture. I control for learning using
the round number as a measure. Table 26 reports changes in efficiency with respect
to the C1 the treatment without communication.
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Table 26: Equilibrium Coordination Across Treatments
Line Asymmetric Circle
Baseline (mean) 0.201 0.118 0.159
(0.045) (0.028) (0.033)
Global 0.495*** 0.286*** 0.232***
(0.114) (0.087) (0.077)
Local 0.503*** 0.312*** 0.350***
(0.101) (0.052) (0.057)
Round 0.0216** 0.0333*** 0.0203***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 360 360 360
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses;
p∗ < 0.10, p∗∗ < 0.05, p∗∗∗ < 0.010
• In order to estimate the effect of the network structure on the likelihood of coordi-
nating on an equilibrium. For each of the communication architectures, I estimate
the following panel logistic regression model with random effects at the group level.
Equilibriumit =
3∑
k=1
βkN
k + κRoundt + εit (29)
Where Equilibriumit is an indicator function which takes the value 1 if the groups
coordinate on any equilibrium profile for group i in period t, NK indicates the net-
work treatment variable, where N1 is the Line, N2 is the Asymmetric, and N3 is the
circle network. I control for learning by using the round number as a measure. The
results in table 27 reports changes in efficiency with respect to the N1 to the line
network.
Table 27: Equilibrium Coordination Across Networks
Baseline Global Local
Line (mean) 0.208 0.693 0.701
(0.039) (0.070) (0.059)
Asymmetric -0.0583 -0.318*** -0.309***
(0.052) (0.103) (0.073)
Circle -0.0417 -0.313*** -0.202**
(0.050) (0.109) (0.083)
Round 0.0110* 0.0263*** 0.0275***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 360 360 360
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses;
p∗ < 0.10, p∗∗ < 0.05, p∗∗∗ < 0.010
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Figure 25: Equilibrium Across Rounds – Line
Baseline Global
Local
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Figure 26: Equilibrium Across Rounds – Asymmetric
Baseline Global
Local
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Figure 27: Equilibrium Across Rounds – Circle
Baseline Global
Local
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Figure 28: Line Group Investment
Baseline Global
Local
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Figure 29: Asymmetric Group Investment
Baseline Global
Local
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Figure 30: Circle Group Investment
Baseline Global
Local
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B.2.1 Results for 1/Round
Table 28: Effect Across Treatment (1/Round)
Line Asymmetric Circle
Global 0.214*** 0.161*** 0.101***
(0.041) (0.036) (0.027)
Local 0.220*** 0.163*** 0.155***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.034)
1/Round -0.0923* -0.0731 -0.0376
(0.054) (0.053) (0.036)
Observations 360 360 360
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 29: Efficiency Across Network (1/Round)
Baseline Local Global
Asymmetric 0.0667* 0.0131 0.0101
(0.037) (0.035) (0.034)
Circle 0.0774** -0.0357 0.0131
(0.037) (0.039) (0.031)
1/Round 0.0234 -0.134*** -0.0921***
(0.040) (0.046) (0.031)
Observations 360 360 360
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 30: Effect of Communication on Investment Decision (1/Round)
A & E C D & E A & E C D & E All
Atleast one neighbor invest -0.0975 -0.0664 -0.0621 -0.126 -0.125 -0.0583 -0.0893*
(0.066) (0.109) (0.072) (0.085) (0.078) (0.064) (0.052)
Global 0.305*** 0.501*** 0.414*** 0.236*** -0.0362 0.589*** 0.111
(0.094) (0.155) (0.090) (0.080) (0.147) (0.124) (0.073)
Local 0.208** 0.495*** 0.358*** 0.136 0.0766 0.574*** 0.206***
(0.101) (0.138) (0.078) (0.087) (0.144) (0.119) (0.073)
Atleast one neighbor invest x Global -0.468*** -0.635*** -0.611*** -0.417*** -0.228 -0.344*** -0.210***
(0.102) (0.146) (0.112) (0.110) (0.144) (0.108) (0.073)
Atleast one neighbor invest x Local -0.452*** -0.720*** -0.621*** -0.343*** -0.408** -0.466*** -0.361***
(0.088) (0.132) (0.098) (0.107) (0.168) (0.111) (0.074)
Invest Lag -0.284*** -0.0611 -0.170*** -0.249*** -0.170** -0.338*** -0.198***
(0.043) (0.057) (0.058) (0.038) (0.069) (0.064) (0.031)
Constant 0.575*** 0.290 0.544*** 0.515*** 0.494** 0.200* 0.583***
(0.111) (0.198) (0.090) (0.094) (0.197) (0.107) (0.066)
1/Round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Experience Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 648 324 648 648 324 648 1620
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 31: Effect of Communication – Line (1/Round)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Invest A Invest B Invest C Invest D Invest E Invest A Invest B Invest C Invest D Invest E Invest A Invest B Invest C Invest D Invest E
Invest A -0.123*** -0.0496 -0.0368 0.0413 -0.472*** 0.256*** -0.249*** 0.129*** -0.623*** 0.249*** -0.0642 0.165***
(0.021) (0.048) (0.047) (0.032) (0.068) (0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.088) (0.074) (0.056) (0.056)
Invest B -0.130*** 0.118*** 0.0478 -0.0455 -0.473*** -0.375*** 0.130*** -0.0970*** -0.619*** -0.263*** 0.213*** 0.226***
(0.025) (0.039) (0.046) (0.047) (0.083) (0.054) (0.041) (0.033) (0.063) (0.061) (0.071) (0.056)
Invest C -0.0581 0.133*** -0.228*** 0.175*** 0.206*** -0.302*** -0.0872* 0.176*** 0.197*** -0.209*** -0.302*** 0.111**
(0.055) (0.043) (0.035) (0.047) (0.038) (0.043) (0.047) (0.033) (0.044) (0.071) (0.058) (0.052)
Invest D -0.0376 0.0493 -0.210*** -0.0676 -0.189*** 0.0982** -0.0822* -0.452*** -0.0495 0.165*** -0.308*** -0.570***
(0.048) (0.046) (0.031) (0.048) (0.038) (0.044) (0.045) (0.052) (0.042) (0.062) (0.039) (0.052)
Invest E 0.0393 -0.0406 0.142*** -0.0530 0.0882*** -0.0661** 0.150*** -0.407*** 0.0871** 0.120*** 0.0677** -0.389***
(0.030) (0.043) (0.038) (0.043) (0.026) (0.030) (0.039) (0.047) (0.040) (0.035) (0.034) (0.049)
1/Round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 32: Effect of Communication – Asymmetric (1/Round)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Invest A Invest B Invest C Invest D Invest E Invest A Invest B Invest C Invest D Invest E Invest A Invest B Invest C Invest D Invest E
Invest A -0.0702** -0.214*** 0.0750* -0.134*** -0.617*** -0.0494 0.148*** 0.139*** -0.464*** -0.129** -0.131*** -0.0119
(0.031) (0.038) (0.038) (0.050) (0.032) (0.059) (0.041) (0.047) (0.039) (0.055) (0.027) (0.035)
Invest B -0.0950** -0.0804* 0.0235 0.106*** -0.653*** -0.276*** 0.0774** 0.0439 -0.649*** -0.480*** -0.321*** -0.0294
(0.043) (0.049) (0.037) (0.038) (0.033) (0.049) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.056) (0.051) (0.055)
Invest C -0.267*** -0.0704 0.141*** 0.157*** -0.0371 -0.196*** -0.0598 0.106*** -0.138** -0.366*** -0.310*** 0.00563
(0.048) (0.043) (0.036) (0.049) (0.044) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.057) (0.047) (0.056) (0.052)
Invest D 0.0885** 0.00853 0.131*** -0.131** 0.170*** 0.0839** -0.0913 -0.674*** -0.148*** -0.260*** -0.329*** -0.535***
(0.045) (0.031) (0.036) (0.060) (0.050) (0.037) (0.064) (0.033) (0.026) (0.044) (0.050) (0.064)
Invest E -0.123*** 0.0763*** 0.118*** -0.105** 0.166*** 0.0496 0.168*** -0.702*** -0.0120 -0.0213 0.00536 -0.480***
(0.048) (0.026) (0.039) (0.050) (0.053) (0.035) (0.051) (0.028) (0.035) (0.040) (0.049) (0.056)
1/Round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 33: Effect of Communication – Circle (1/Round)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Invest A Invest B Invest C Invest D Invest E Invest A Invest B Invest C Invest D Invest E Invest A Invest B Invest C Invest D Invest E
Invest A 0.00994 0.203*** 0.125*** -0.177*** -0.353*** 0.0134 -0.00678 -0.0921** -0.280*** -0.0137 0.107** -0.331***
(0.048) (0.073) (0.044) (0.024) (0.046) (0.056) (0.051) (0.041) (0.045) (0.052) (0.043) (0.040)
Invest B 0.00561 0.149*** -0.0554* 0.142*** -0.371*** -0.275*** 0.0374 0.0709 -0.277*** -0.402*** 0.0510 0.139***
(0.027) (0.043) (0.029) (0.040) (0.054) (0.049) (0.043) (0.046) (0.053) (0.043) (0.036) (0.036)
Invest C 0.115*** 0.150*** 0.0272 -0.0519 0.0132 -0.257*** -0.111** 0.154*** -0.0140 -0.416*** -0.259*** 0.136***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.036) (0.053) (0.055) (0.043) (0.050) (0.045) (0.053) (0.034) (0.052) (0.035)
Invest D 0.0777*** -0.0612* 0.0301 -0.0502 -0.00594 0.0312 -0.0987** -0.134*** 0.0926** 0.0447 -0.219*** -0.211***
(0.027) (0.032) (0.039) (0.052) (0.045) (0.035) (0.042) (0.037) (0.039) (0.033) (0.044) (0.050)
Invest E -0.117*** 0.167*** -0.0610 -0.0535 -0.0802** 0.0587 0.137*** -0.133*** -0.300*** 0.126*** 0.118*** -0.219***
(0.015) (0.049) (0.064) (0.053) (0.034) (0.038) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.048)
1/Round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 34: Number of Neighbors and Investments (1/Round)
Baseline Global Local
Line Asymmetric Line Asymmetric Line Asymmetric
Two neighbors -0.00216 -0.0358 0.0503 -0.123** 0.0557* -0.0289
(0.059) (0.102) (0.038) (0.063) (0.034) (0.052)
Three neighbors -0.252*** 0.146*** 0.189***
(0.070) (0.051) (0.058)
# neighbors invest -0.0472 -0.0129 -0.233*** -0.227*** -0.258*** -0.283***
(0.033) (0.022) (0.024) (0.030) (0.020) (0.028)
Invest Lag -0.180*** -0.191*** -0.252*** -0.397*** -0.289*** -0.316***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.068) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
1/Round Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Race Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Session Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 540 540 540 540 540 540
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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B.2.2 Results for Periods 5-10
Figure 31: Efficiency Across Periods 5-10
Figure 32: Efficiency Across Periods 5-10 – Bar
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Table 35: Effect of Treatment – Periods 5-10
Line Asymmetric Circle
Global 0.210*** 0.177*** 0.103***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.027)
Local 0.221*** 0.159*** 0.153***
(0.046) (0.044) (0.043)
Round 0.0176* 0.00493 0.0262***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 216 216 216
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 36: Effect of Network – Periods 5-10
Line Asymmetric Circle
Asymmetric 0.0675 0.0337 0.00496
(0.047) (0.036) (0.044)
Circle 0.0665 -0.0407 -0.00198
(0.047) (0.039) (0.036)
Round 0.0201** 0.00907 0.0196***
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 216 216 216
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 37: Frequency of Equilibrium – Periods 5-10
Baseline Global Local
Line
Not an equilibria 78% 26% 22%
L1 - A, C & E 7% 35% 32%
L2 - B & D 4% 36% 32%
L3 - B & E 3% 1% 8%
L4 - A & D 8% 1% 6%
Asymmetric
Not an equilibria 82% 33% 47%
A1 - A, C & E 8% 18% 13%
A2 - B & E 4% 11% 13%
A3 - A & D 6% 14% 17%
A4 - B & D 0% 24% 11%
Circle
Not an equilibria 82% 60% 51%
C1 - A & D 3% 10% 11%
C2 - A & C 0% 4% 7%
C3 - B & E 8% 10% 13%
C4 - C & E 6% 7% 11%
C5 - B & D 1% 10% 7%
B.3 Proof – Proposition
Lemma 2. In the baseline game without cost sharing rules, in the Line network, the pure
strategy Nash equilibria are (1,0,1,0,1), (0,1,0,1,0), (1,0,0,1,0), and (0,1,0,0,1). In the
Asymmetric network, the pure-strategy Nash equilibria are (1,0,1,0,1), (1,0,0,1,0), and
(0,1,0,0,1). In the Circle network, the pure strategy Nash equilibria are (1,0,0,1,0), (1,0,1,0,0),
(0,1,0,0,1), (0,0,1,0,1) and (0,1,0,1,0)
Proof. See Lemma 1 
Proposition 6. Commitments made in the communication stage are self-enforcing.
Proof. Suppose agent i commits to invest. Based on Lemma 2 the best reply for all her
neighbors is to not invest. Agent i gets a higher payoff of ui(1,aj , G) = b − c, by follow-
ing through on her commitment since deviating from her commitment yeilds a lower pay-
off ui(0,aj , G) = 0. Similarly, suppose agent i commits to not invest, based on Lemma 2
the best reply for at least one of her neighbors is to invest. Agent i gets a higher payoff of
ui(0,aj , G) = b, by following through on her commitment since deviating from her com-
mitment yeilds a lower payoff ui(1,aj , G) = b− c. 
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